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INTRODUCTION
The separation of ownership and control in corporations leads to a well documented agency
problem between the shareholders and the management of publicly traded companies.  Besides
direct monitoring of management activities, companies try to compensate managers in a way
such that their interests are aligned with those of the shareholders.  The design of compensation
contracts to efficiently mitigate the  “stewardship problem” has attracted researchers’ interest.1 
Theoretical results in this area of research suggest, for example, that all available performance
measures should be used in a contract, as long as they are (conditionally) informative about the
actions chosen by management.  Empirical evidence, on the other hand, shows that a shift in the
1990s lead to a situation where for a major fraction of CEOs, stock price performance is the
dominant determinant of their compensation and the “sensitivity deriving from cash compensa-
tion is generally swamped by that deriving from stock and stock option portfolios”.2  This shift
is somewhat puzzling as theory predicts that stock price does not aggregate the available
information in a way to provide the best incentives for a firm’s management.  This intuitive
result stems from the different objectives capital market participants and shareholders have. 
While the former are estimating future risk and returns, the latter try to infer past managerial
actions.  For this reason, the weights capital markets apply to certain pieces of information do
not reflect the weights shareholders would assign to the same information in incentive contracts. 
One explanation for the heavy reliance on stock prices is that they are readily observable
measures which can be used without costs.  More important however is probably the existence
of information which cannot be used in a contract but is used by capital markets.  Contractual
information has to be verifiable to some extent, information used to form expectations does not. 
1 Prendergast (1999) provides a review of a large body of this literature.
2 Bushman/ Smith (2001, 242).
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Hence, using prices in contracts enables the current shareholders to indirectly contract on
information that otherwise could not be used.  This information can come from a variety of
sources.  To formulate their expectations about future risk and returns, capital markets rely on
different providers of information; analysts provide forecasts and analyses, financial press
publishes facts and opinions, some investors have private information, and finally companies
themselves provide extensive information through corporate disclosure.  
This thesis studies the interplay of changes in accounting disclosure and the solution to the
stewardship problem.  I develop theoretical models that try to explain the different decisions
managers, current shareholders, and potential shareholders face.  The models incorporate
different interdependent aspects of the decision to disclose information, the design of contracts
between current shareholders and the corporation’s management, and the aggregation of
information into price.
The first essay builds on the observation, that firms use information in compensation
contracts which is not available to capital market participants.3  Potential investors on the other
hand, as described above, use information that cannot be used in a contract to form their
expectations.  While this information is of forward-looking nature, it is often informative about
the actions a firm’s management chose in the past.  Straightforward examples are a manager’s
reputation or the success of an organizational change.  I classify contractible and non-
contractible information as “hard” and “soft” information.4  Disclosing different types of
information has a different impact on the value of stock price as a measure of management’s
performance.  In this setting, I study the value of disclosing supplemental information from a
stewardship perspective.  My investigation is motivated by ongoing calls for more corporate
3 E.g., Hayes/ Schaefer (2000)
4 Petersen (2004) provides a discussion about the characteristics of hard and soft information.
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disclosure of soft information5 and a change of the view of accounting disclosure.  At the end of
the 19th century shareholders began to hold diversified portfolios and modern financial reporting
emerged because investors collectively demanded “help in managing the new social relationships
[...] between them and management.”6  However, over time companies were asked to provide
more forward-looking information to increase the efficiency of capital markets for allocating
capital.  In the current “Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting”7 the FASB even
expresses the view that providing information that helps potential investors in valuing a company
also helps current investors in evaluating management’s past action choices.  I present conditions
under which this is not the case but disclosure is detrimental to the expected cash flow.  I show
that the disclosure of both hard and soft information then leads to a loss in production.  Firms
could react to this by decreasing their voluntary disclosure which terminally might even reduce
the informativeness of stock prices about future cash flows.
The second essay incorporates findings that the composition of companies’ shareholders
influences the level of disclosure and managerial incentives.  Empirical studies suggest that
institutional investors can be characterized by the length of their investment horizon and their
portfolio turnover.8  So called “dedicated” institutions have a long-term view,“quasi-indexers”
use indexing for their portfolio decisions, and the third group, “transient” investors, are interested
in short-term trading gains.  While the first essay investigated the value of disclosure from the
perspective of dedicated investors, the second essay analyzes the effect of institutional investors
potentially having a short-term investment horizon, e.g., they might sell their shares before
5 Seligman (1995, 610) even states that the
“past two decades have witnessed a significant expansion of what must be disclosed by all registrants [...]
This expansion can be termed the ‘soft information revolution’ in the mandatory disclosure system”.
6 Bryer (1993, 649).
7 See Financial Accounting Standards Board (2006).
8 E.g., Bushee (1998).
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realizing cash flows from production.  Here, I can expand the investigation of the valuation of
disclosure and study the trade-off arising from a more efficient solution to the stewardship
problem and potential trading gains.  I focus on transient institutional investors and study the
relation between market microstructure, disclosure, and managerial incentives.  The model
predicts that managerial incentives can decrease with higher market liquidity because the
transient investor trades off gains from disclosing information (a more efficient solution to the
stewardship problem) with expected costs (foregoing potential trading gains based on private
information).  I can show that this particular group of investors might prefer to withhold
information even though disclosure would increase production.  My results suggest that insider
trading increases the informativeness of stock prices but it might only do so if one treats
disclosure as exogenous.  While a dedicated investor would disclose information if it helps
mitigating the incentive problem, an investor who is interested in short-term trading gains might
prefer to keep the information private.  Following my results, empirical studies investigating the
relations between liquidity, insider trading, and managerial incentives should control for the
composition of the firm’s investor base and the level of disclosure.
A different approach to gain insights about corporate disclosure and managerial incentives
is employed in the third essay.  While I focused on the value of disclosure for different types of
investors in the first two essays, I now examine the relative weights placed on price and non-
price measures in compensation contracts.  One prediction of agency theory is that the relative
weights assigned to two measures in a contract are functions of the relative “signal-to-noise”
ratios of the respective measures.  Recent studies suggest that observed contracts do not behave
as predicted when examining changes in the measures’ variances.9  The measures that are usually
investigated are price and some accounting measure.  The tested hypothesis are derived by
agency-theoretic models with two generic performance measures and capital markets’ role in
9 See Core/ Guay/ Verrecchia (2003).
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aggregating information as well as the possibility that firms write contracts over more than just
one accounting measure are usually not included.  Furthermore, the noise in accounting measures
is often proxied by the variance of a published accounting measure (e.g., annual earnings).  I
show that incorporating the price formation process and allowing for multiple contractible
accounting measures can significantly affect the derived hypotheses.  The first setting I employ
is one in which only a public accounting report and price are available for contracting.  This is
descriptive of a company using stock price and annual earnings in the compensation contract
with their CEO.  The model predicts that the relative weight on the accounting report as well as
the relative incentives stemming from it can increase in the report’s variance.  The reason for this
effect is that the report is used for both, setting incentives and evaluating the firm.  In a second
setting I show the robustness of the result.  Here, I allow for an additional contractible measure
that is kept private and find a similar result.  The relative weight placed on the private measure
can increase in the variance of the public report.  This result is confirmed when I consider the
incentives stemming from non-price measures relative to those from price.  Summarizing, my
results suggest that the observed increase in accounting measures’ relative weight in their noise
does not necessarily countradicts the importance of agency theory in explaining compensation
contracts.  I finally suggest an alternative setting to test the influence of agency theory on
compensation contracts: changes in the level of disclosure.  Here, I am able to derive non-
ambiguous predictions: the difference in the incentive weights of the disclosed measure relative
to price will be higher for firms which disclose measures with higher idiosyncratic noise.
I summarize conclusions from the three essays in the final chapter.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Standard setters and regulators justify reporting and disclosure requirements by the demand of
capital owners for decision-useful information (O’Connell 2007, 217).  Following the
argumentation applied by FASB and IASB, a greater volume of timely information enhances
market efficiency and decreases the cost of capital.  More recently, regulators require firms to
increase the disclosure of soft information.1  Soft information “includes less certain information
known to an issuer, such as projections and other forward-looking information” (SEC
Commissioner R.Y. Roberts 1994).  More generally, we define soft information as information
that cannot be verified and, thus, cannot be used in a contract between two parties (i.e., the
information is non-contractible).2  This definition covers such diverse examples as information
on sales forecasts, the progress of an investment project (Choi, Kristiansen and Nahm 2007),
management reputation (Stocken and Verrecchia 1999), and the closeness of the relation between
a firm and its bank (Liberti 2003). 
We argue that while disclosing information to investors may improve price informativeness,
disclosure of soft information can be detrimental to firm owners from a stewardship perspective. 
More specifically, we identify conditions under which the value of publicly reported information
is negative.  Key to the negative value is the dilution of managerial incentives as a consequence
of a noisier and less congruent market price that results when the disclosed information is
impounded in the price.  Therefore, gains in price informativeness come at the expense of firm
value.
Disclosure of soft information is pervasive.  For example, Tsao (2002) notes that “a
company’s own filings to the Securities & Exchange Commission are filled with revealing
1 Examples refer to the introduction of the “soft harbor rule” in 1979 and its reform in 1995, which both tried to
encourage the disclosure of forward looking information, Seamons and Rouse (1997).
2 Similarly, Petersen (2004, 2) defines soft information as “information which is difficult to completely summarize
in a numeric score.”
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information about prospects for sales and profits.”  Empirical evidence suggests that soft
information in earnings announcements is value relevant (Davis, Piger and Sedor 2007) and
affects price volatility (Demers and Vega 2008).  Besides firm disclosures, analysts’ reports and
press-related statements release further soft information to investors (Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky
and Macskassy 2008).  
Understanding the stewardship value of accounting disclosures is important because
regulators frequently presume complementarity between stewardship and decision-usefulness. 
For example, the IASB recently announced that “... the Board agreed that stewardship or
accountability should not be a separate objective of financial reporting by business entities in the
converged framework” (IASB 2005, para. 24).  More specifically, the IASB claims that
“financial information directed at the primary objective of providing information useful for
investment [...] is useful for other purposes, including assessing management’s stewardship” 
(IASB 2005, para. 24).  Bushman, Engel and Smith (2006) provide supportive evidence for this
claim.  On the contrary, theoretical analysis by Gjesdal (1981), Paul (1992), and Feltham and Xie
(1994) emphasizes potential conflicts between stewardship and decision-usefulness; e.g., Gassen
(2008) provides supportive evidence for this view.  By identifying conditions where extensive
mandatory disclosure of soft information destroys firm value, our study yields important insights
to the regulator.
Given that market prices aggregate any information available to investors, by using the firm’s
market price as a performance measure in the contract with the manager, firm owners are able
to indirectly contract on otherwise non-contractible information (Bushman and Indjejikian
1993).3  In situations where the accounting system internally generates soft information (e.g., a
3  This statement hinges on the contracting usefulness of soft information.  Whereas, e.g., information on the success
of an in-house training program or the success of implementing a new software are straightforward examples of useful signals,
forward-looking information can be useful as well.  Even though participants in an agency would most likely not want to sign
a contract on pure expectations, prospective information often contains information about past performance.  For example,
Information that may be informative about the manager’s effort, but that may not be contractible, includes information
about the relative performance of the firm within the industry and information about the manager’s reputation.
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report that compiles “soft facts” that may be important to investment decisions or projections that
are necessary when preparing financial statements), this result suggests that it can be beneficial
for firm owners to publicly report this soft information (e.g., by including the information in the
management report).  However, it is unclear at this point whether firm owners should disclose
the entire amount or merely a subset of the soft information.  In this regard, our results shed light
on optimal firm-level disclosure policy.  
This study first contributes to the discussion on the economic consequences of mandatory
disclosure.  In particular, we address the disclosure of soft information and identify the
incremental stewardship value of varying the quantity of publicly reported information.  By
identifying conditions under which a larger quantity of disclosed information yields a negative
value, we establish that increasing mandatory disclosure of soft information can decrease firm
value.  Secondly, we present a rationale for the firm not to follow a full-disclosure strategy but
rather to commit ex ante to withhold some information from capital market participants.  More
specifically, given that soft information is available to investors from other sources outside the
firm, there exist conditions where it is beneficial to not disclose supplemental (hard or soft)
information.  In this respect, the study contributes to the discussion on voluntary disclosure.4 
More generally, we contribute to the ongoing discussion on the relation of stewardship and
decision-usefulness.  In particular, our results support the opponents of the IASB’s proposal to
drop stewardship as a separate objective of financial accounting.
In our analysis, an agent performs multiple tasks and is evaluated using multiple performance
measures.  While we only consider performance measures that are (conditionally) informative
(Stocken and Verrecchia 1999)
Likewise,
... analysts can help interpret the implication of a newly announced technology development for future performance;
and corporate disclosures can provide facts and explanations to confirm or deny speculations, predictions, and
forecasts made by analysts. (Chen, Cheng and Lo 2006, 2)
4 In this regard, we neglect differences between mandatory and voluntary disclosure regimes.  We thank Stefan
Reichelstein for pointing out this issue.
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about the agent’s actions, only a subset of these signals can be used by the principal in the
contract with the agent (i.e., only a subset of the generated signals is contractible information). 
In addition, a subset of the generated signals are publicly reported to capital market participants.5 
Investors use all information available (including non-contractible information) to form
expectations about firm value.  In the model, the gross market price is equal to investors’
expectation about the firm’s terminal payoff conditional on the available information and their
beliefs about the actions selected by the agent.  To simplify the analysis, we assume the principal
is risk neutral, the agent has exponential utility and quadratic effort cost, the performance
measures are normally distributed, and the compensation contract is restricted to be a linear
function of the contractible performance measures, including market price.6  We determine the
value of publicly reported (supplemental) information by comparing the expected net payoff to
the principal under two information systems; the information systems differ regarding the
disclosure of a single performance measure.  This disclosure value is used to assess the economic
consequences of increasing mandatory requirements regarding the disclosure of soft information
and to investigate the firm’s decision to voluntarily disclose information.
Our results indicate that the disclosure value depends on the type of information that is to be
disclosed (i.e., whether it is contractible or non-contractible information) and the amount and
type of information already available to the investors.  For example, the principal is, in general,
indifferent regarding the disclosure of contractible information if investors have only contractible
information plus no more than a single non-contractible signal.  However, the principal can have
strict preferences regarding the disclosure of contractible information if investors receive
multiple non-contractible signals.  Likewise, the principal weakly benefits from a publicly
5 Hayes and Schaefer (2000) provide empirical evidence that supports the hypothesis that firms’ contracts include
performance measures that are only observable by the contracting parties and that these measures are informative about the
firm’s future prospects.
6 Core, Guay and Verrecchia (2003) and Leone, Wu and Zimmerman (2006) provide empirical evidence suggesting
that managerial contracts include both accounting information (e.g., annual earnings) and market price as performance measures.
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reported non-contractible performance measure if this signal is the only non-contractible
information released to the investors.  However, given that the investors receive non-contractible
information (e.g., from analysts), the principal can be strictly worse off if she discloses a
supplemental non-contractible signal.
Key to a potentially negative disclosure value is that investors’ aggregation of information
for pricing purposes differs from the aggregation that is optimal for the incentive contract with
the agent (Paul 1992, Feltham and Xie 1994) and that the non-contractibility of information
prevents the principal from adjusting and undoing investor aggregation.  The difference in
aggregation yields two reasons for a detrimental effect of disclosure on the principal’s expected
net payoff.  First, while the impact of more disclosure on the sensitivity of price to the agent’s
action is ambiguous, disclosing more information weakly increases price volatility.  Intuitively,
the principal is worse off if disclosure yields a smaller signal-to-noise ratio.  Secondly, disclosure
can reduce the congruity of market price relative to the firm’s terminal value, yielding a less
efficient effort allocation across tasks.  In particular, non-congruity increases if, e.g., relative to
the firm’s terminal value, the supplemental information is less congruent than the initial
information.  Importantly, disclosing contractible information affects the weights assigned by
investors to the available information (including the weights assigned to the non-contractible
information)7 and may result in a smaller signal-to-noise ratio or a less congruent market price. 
Due to the non-contractibility of some of the information that is available to the investors, the
principal is unable to undo any changes to the investors’ aggregation of information into price
that are induced by the disclosure decision.8  Thus, the divergence in the aggregation of the
performance measures combined with the non-contractibility of disclosed performance measures
7 Chen et al. (2006) observe that investors’ reliance on other sources of information varies with corporate disclosure.
8 Note that both losses to the principal’s expected net payoff are robust to changes in the capital-market setting.  In
particular, the losses also arise in settings where investors have asymmetric information.  For example, we can show that the
same effects occur in a Kyle (1985)-type capital market, where one  trader is better informed than the rest of the market.
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causes the negative disclosure value.
Several implications follow from our findings.  First, our results are in stark contrast to the
commonly held view that the usefulness of market price as a performance measure increases with
the degree to which it measures firm value.  For example, according to Healy and Palepu (2001,
422) “stock compensation is more likely to be an efficient form of remuneration for managers
and owners if stock prices are a precise estimate of firm values.”  Secondly, our results
emphasize that the value of publicly reported soft information crucially depends on the
magnitude of soft information already available to investors.  Then, depending on the type of
incentive problem faced by firm owners, changes in mandatory disclosure requirements for soft
and hard information can leave some firms worse off.  Finally, non-verifiable soft information
is presumably more sensitive to unproductive actions as compared with hard (accounting)
information.  Then, disclosing (more) soft information reduces the congruency of market price,
relative to firm value.  While investors in their pricing can factor out the impact of window
dressing activities on their expectations of future firm value, managers will nevertheless be
motivated to exert window dressing effort (Fischer and Verrecchia 2000).  Assuming that
earnings management is a proxy for the management of soft information, we expect to observe
a positive relation between the disclosure of soft information and the extent of earnings
management.  
Regarding prior work on disclosure and incentive contracting, our work is most closely
related to that of Feltham and Xie (1994), Bushman and Indjejikian (1993), and Christensen and
Feltham (2000).  While Feltham and Xie (1994) establish a non-negative value of additional
performance measures in a multi-task setting, we find that disclosing additional contractible and
non-contractible performance measures can have a negative value.  Bushman and Indjejikian
(1993) assume that market price includes private information to investors, and that increased
disclosure can reduce investors’ incentives to privately acquire information.  Hence, similar to
-14-
our result, increased disclosure can have a negative value in their setting.  Different to our focus
on the disclosure of ex post-information, Christensen and Feltham (2000) consider incentives
to motivate the agent to disclose pre-decision information.  Finally, our result that accounting
information and stock price are only used simultaneously if stock price contains non-contractible
information about the agent’s action is consistent with Baiman and Verrecchia (1995).
Our work is also related to the literature on reasons for partial disclosure.  In addition to
explanations based on, e.g., the proprietary nature of superior information (Verrecchia 1983),
uncertainty about the existence of information (Dye 1985), and uncertainty about the type of
information (Teoh and Kwan 1991), our results indicate that the concurrent usage of information
to address managerial incentive problems can provide a complementary rationale for partial
disclosure.  While the literature on partial disclosure usually discusses the ex post decision to
disclose information (i.e., after the information is generated), Guay and Verrecchia (2007) show
that it is valuable for the firm to commit ex ante to a full disclosure strategy if the goal is a high
stock price.  To the contrary, our results indicate that it can be optimal to commit ex ante to a
partial disclosure strategy if the objective is to provide efficient incentives to a manager; it is
straightforward that this increase in efficiency will also lead to a higher expected stock price in
equilibrium.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, we present the basic model,
discuss investors’ pricing, and derive optimal contracts when the principal uses market price as
the sole performance measure in the contract with the agent.  In Section 3, we determine the
value of publicly reported non-contractible performance measures.  In Subsection 3.1, the
principal discloses a single performance measure (e.g., manager’s reputation) and in Subsections
3.2 she considers the disclosure of supplemental non-contractible information (e.g., the success
of adopting a new software).  Section 4 extends the analysis from 3.2 by investigating the
disclosure of supplemental non-contractible information in a multi-task setting.  Finally, Section
-15-
5 analyzes disclosure value of contractible information, given that the investors also receive non-
contractible information.  Conclusions are presented in Section 6.
2. BASIC NOTATION AND MODEL STRUCTURE
2.1 Agent’s Actions, Performance Measures, and Price Formation
At date 0, the principal, acting on behalf of the firm’s long term risk neutral owners, hires an
agent to provide effort at date 1 in return for compensation at date 2.  The agent expends costly
effort that influences the payoff to the principal, and his choice of effort level is represented by
the a 0 ú.  We assume a linear relation between effort and the firm’s terminal payoff9, i.e.,
x ' b a % gx,
where b 0 ú represents the productivity of the agent’s effort and gx ~ N(0, σx2) represents random
events beyond the agent’s control.  The agent’s personal cost of effort κ(a) is assumed to be
κ(a) ' ½ a2.
At date 2, information system η generates ms performance measures and releases this
information to the principal and to investors.  Performance measures are either publicly reported
to investors (i.e., public performance measures) or undisclosed and only released to the principal
(i.e., “internal” performance measures).  To keep the model as parsimonious as possible we
initially assume that the generated performance measures can not be used in the contract between
principal and agent (i.e., only soft information is generated).  As the undisclosed information can
neither be used by the principal in the contract with the agent nor by investors when updating
their beliefs about the terminal payoff we can neglect these measures and assume that all ms
measures of soft information are publicly reported.  We assume a linear relation between effort
and performance, i.e.,
9 Alternatively, x may also represent the firm’s future market price.  We choose the term payoff to distinguish market
price at date 2 from firm value.
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yi ' mi a % gi, i ' 1, ..., ms,
where mi represents the sensitivity of performance measure i to the agent’s effort, gi is a normally
distributed noise terms with gi ~ N(0,σi2) and variance σi2.  The noise of each performance
measure reflects uncontrollable events that affect the firm’s payoff plus inaccuracy of the
accounting system (i.e., measurement error).  Specifically, the noise is assumed to be
gi ' gx ρix % gμi, i ' 1, ..., ms,
where ρix characterizes the correlation of performance measures i to the output and gμi represents
measurement error inherent in measure i, with gμi ~ N(0,σμi2), σμi2 is the variance matrix of the
measurement-related noise term, Cov[gx,gμi] ' 0, and Cov[gμi,gμj] ' ρij σμi σμj.  Thus σi2 ' ρix2 σx2
% σμi2 and Cov[yi,yj] ' ρix ρjx σx2 % ρij σμi σμj, i ' 1, ..., ms, where ρix2σx2 is the output-related noise
inherent in performance measure I.
The capital market is assumed to consist of homogeneous rational investors who set the price
equal to the expected value of the firm conditional on all available information.10,11 We assume
that the signals are disclosed without additional error.12  As the performance measures follow a
normal distribution, the price will be a linear aggregation of the available accounting reports. 
Hence, the (gross) market price, its variance, and its sensitivity to the agent’s effort choice are
characterized by
π(η) ' E[x|η] ' πo( ,η) % , (1a)
with
10 This setting is equivalent to Feltham and Xie (1994) and similar to the market maker’s behavior in Kyle (1985). 
Note that our results hold under the assumption of an incomplete market with private information amongst investors.  Then, the
information that is impounded into price through the trading decisions of informed investors can be viewed as public soft
information.
11 A possible question at this point refers to the consequences if the principal (strategically) chooses not to release some
signals (we thank Stan Baiman for this observation).  The capital market participants know about the set of public signals.  In
our setting, the principal decides about the disclosure before she learns the outcome of the performance measures.  Thus, by
observing the disclosure decision, investors learn nothing regarding the realization of the signals.
12 This assumption is common in the literature on discretionary disclosure, where disclosure is often assumed to be
truthful.  For a review of this literature see Verrecchia (2001).
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σπ2(η) / Var[π|y1,..., ], and (1b)
mπ(η) / ME[π]/Ma, (1c)
where  denotes the investors’ expectations regarding the agent’s action, πo a constant, and αi
the weight of report yi in price.  Observe that the weights αi(η) and market price π(η), its volatility
σπ2(η), and its sensitivity to the agent’s effort choice all vary with information system η.13  The
constant πo depends on  as the investors take their ex ante expectation about the reports into
account when forming price.  We will treat price as a generic performance measure in the
analysis of the optimal contract and discuss the resulting price and its characteristics in section
3.
2.2 Agent’s Compensation, Preferences, and Optimal Actions
At date 0, the principal offers the agent a linear contract z ' (f,vπ), where f is the agent’s fixed
wage and vπ the incentive rate for market price.  Hence, the agent’s compensation w, given price
π, and contract z is
w(π,z) ' f % vπ π.
We assume that the agent’s preferences are represented by a negative exponential utility
function, with
u(z,a) ' !exp[!r(w ! κ(a))],
where r is the coefficient of his absolute risk aversion.
Maximizing the expected utility is equivalent to maximizing the certainty equivalent, which
is characterized by
CE(z,a) ' E[w|z,a] ! κ(a) ! ½ r Var[w|z] (2)
' f % vπ (πo % mπ a) ! ½ a2 ! ½ r vπ2 σπ2.
The agent chooses a to maximize his certainty equivalent.  Differentiating (2) with respect
to a, given contract z, provides the following characterization of the agent’s action choices.
13 However, in order to simplify notation, whenever the result is unambiguous we omit the reference regarding the
impact of information system η on αi, π, mπ, and σπ2.
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Lemma 1: Given contract z ' (f,vπ), the agent’s optimal action choices are characterized by
a†(vπ) ' mπ vπ. (3)
Proof: Differentiating (2) with respect to a, and solving the first-order conditions for this
variable results in the optimal action choices as specified in (3).
Observe that the weights for non-contractible information (i.e., the weights for the public soft
information) are given by the investors’ aggregation (i.e., αi).  With respect to these signals, by
selecting vπ the principal can only vary the intensity of the incentives but not the aggregation of
the different reports.
2.3 Principal’s Contract Choice
When the principal offers contract z to the agent, she has to take into account that the agent
provides unobservable effort and chooses whether to accept the contract.  The actions that are
induced by z are characterized by (3).  Also, the agent will only participate in the firm if his
contract z is such that it provides him with his reservation wage, which is scaled to equal zero,
i.e.,
CE(z,a†) $ 0. (4)
The principal is assumed to be risk neutral with respect to the terminal value of the firm.  She
is interested in maximizing the expected terminal value net of the agent’s compensation14, i.e.,
Π(a,z,η) ' E[x ! w|a,z,η]. (5)
The principal chooses z such as to maximize (5) subject to (4) and (3).  Substituting (3) into (2),
choosing f such that CE(z,a†) ' 0, and substituting f † and (3) into (5) gives the principal’s
unconstrained decision problem:
Π(vπ,η) ' b mπ vπ ! ½ mπ2 vπ2 ! ½ r vπ2 σπ2. (6)
14 We assume the principal to act in the interest of the long-term shareholders.  The latter are not interested in short-
term prices but in the firm’s terminal value.  The same assumption is made by Baiman and Verrecchia (1995) and Feltham and
Xie (1994), for a study on the effects of firm owners’ short-term interests on incentive contracts and disclosure decisions see
Heinle/ Hofmann (2009).
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Proposition 1 shows the solution to the principal’s decision problem.15
Proposition 1: The optimal incentive rate and the principal’s expected net payoff are
characterized by
vπ† ' Q!1 b mπ, (7a)
Π†(η) ' ½ Q!1 b2 mπ2, (7b)
with Q ' mπ2 % r σπ2.
Using market price, the principal can indirectly contract on non-contractible information.  The
solution in (7a) and (7b) is identical to Section V in Feltham and Xie (1994) where the principal
does not use contractible information other than price in the contract with the agent.  The relative
weights of the public signals in the price formation define mπ as well as σπ2 and are given by the
aggregation αi chosen by investors when inferring the firm’s terminal value.  As noted above,
given information system η, the principal can not choose the weight on individual reports but can
only choose the weight of price in the contract.  To summarize, given that the principal uses
market price when contracting with the agent the aggregation of public signals by investors
directly affects the principal’s expected net payoff.  As will become obvious from the next
section, when aggregating public information, the investors are ignorant regarding the impact
of their aggregation on the principal’s surplus.
3. VALUE OF DISCLOSING SOFT INFORMATION TO INVESTORS
Varying the set of performance measures that are reported to investors will, in general, alter the
aggregation  of information in price and affect the optimal incentive rate as well as the
principal’s expected net payoff.  Following, the the value of disclosing information to investors
depends on the price formation and the initially available public information.
Let ηo represent the initial information system with a set of publicly reported performance
15 The propositions are proven in Appendix A.
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measures.  Next, consider ηs that is identical to ηo except for an additional publicly reported
performance measure ys.  The value of disclosing ys to investors (i.e., the disclosure value)
follows from comparing the expected net payoff to the principal under ηo and ηs.  In particular:
Definition 1: The value of an additional, publicly reported performance measure ys is given
by
V†(ys|ηo) / Π†(ηs) ! Π†(ηo). (8)
Following (8), in general, the disclosure value of the supplemental performance measure will
depend on the nature of the incentive problem, the characteristics of ys, and the set of further
disclosed performance measures (characterized by ηo).  To gain insight into the value of an
additional, publicly reported performance measure, we subsequently consider several special
cases.  In Section 3.1, we consider the baseline setting where the performance measure under
study is the only information that is released to investors.  This setting will be extended in
Section 3.2 where we considers the disclosure of supplemental non-contractible information.
3.1 Disclosure of a Single Performance Measure
To illustrate the value of disclosing a single type of information to investors, the simplest case
to consider is one in which there is only one performance measure.  More specifically, y1 ' m
a % ρ1xgx % gμ1, where ρ1xgx is output-related fluctuation reflected in y1 and gμ1 is measurement
noise, with gx ~ N(0,σx2), gμ1 ~ N(0,σμ12), and Cov[gμ1,gx] ' 0; σ12 / Var[y1] ' ρ1x2σx2 % σμ12 is the
variance of performance measure y1.  Under η0, no information regarding the firm’s terminal
payoff is publicly reported.  On the other hand, under η1, y1 is disclosed to investors.  As we,
initially, only consider non-contractible information, the expected payoff to the principal equals
zero under information system η0.  The only information about the agent’s effort can not be used
by either capital market participants or the principal.
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Table 1.1
Disclosure of a Single Performance Measure
η0 - no public performance measure
π(η0) '  ' 0, (T1.1a)
σπ2(η0) ' 0, (T1.1b)
mπ(η0) ' 0, (T1.1c)
a† ' 0, (T1.1d)
v1† ' 0, (T1.1e)
Π†(η0) ' 0, (T1.1f)
η1 - disclosure of y1 with ρ1x … 0
a†(vπ) ' α* m vπ, (T1.2a)
π(y1|η1) ' (m2 % r σπ2/α*2)!1 b2 m2 % α* (y1 ! E[y1| ,z,η1]), (T1.2b)
σπ2(η1) ' 0, (T1.2c)
mπ(η1) ' 0, (T1.2d)
vπ† ' 1/α* (m2 % r σπ2/α*2)!1 b m, (T1.2e)
Π†(η1) ' ½ [m2 % r (ρ1x2σx2 % σμ12)]!1 b2 m2, (T1.2f)
with α* ' (ρ1x2 % σμ12/σx2)!1 ρ1x,
σπ2(η1) ' (ρ1x2 % σμ12/σx2)!1 ρ1x2 σx2, and
E[y1| ,z,η1] ' (m2 % r σπ2/α*2)!1 b m3.
Table 1.1 shows price, its characteristics as a performance measure, the incentive rate, and
the expected net payoff to the principal under information systems η0 and η1.  (T1.1a - f) illustrate
that the principal cannot directly use the performance measure if y1 is soft information.  Hence,
if, under η0, y1 is not disclosed, the principal cannot motivate the agent to exert effort such that
her expected net payoff as well as the market price are equal to zero.  To the contrary, with η1,
i.e., given that non-contractible information is disclosed, y1 is impounded in price.  Hence, the
principal can indirectly contract on y1.  As the performance measure follows a normal
distribution, in computing the price the investors correct the information for the unconditional
mean and weight the information according to their covariance with the terminal value, scaled
by the information’s precision.  Following (T1.2b), y1 is impounded in price if it is assigned a
non-zero weight α*, i.e., if it is informative about uncontrollable events that affect the firm’s
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terminal payoff (i.e., if ρ1x … 0).  Additionally, (T1.4e) and (T1.4f) show that disclosing y1
enables the principal to induce agent effort and results in a positive expected net payoff to the
principal.16  Proposition 2 summarizes the results regarding the disclosure value of a single
performance measure.
Proposition 2: Disclosing soft information is strictly valuable to the principal if it is
informative about uncontrollable events that affect the firm’s terminal payoff (i.e., V†(y1|η0)
> 0 if ρ1x … 0).
The proof follows directly from substituting (T1.1f) and (T1.2f) into (8).
Following Proposition 2, the principal has strict preferences for disclosing y1 if it is
impounded into price.  Key to this result is that under η0 market price is not used in the agent’s
contract.  Therefore, while disclosing y1 affects investors’ inference regarding the firm’s terminal
payoff and, thus, market price, by setting vπ ' 0 under η1 the principal can always mimic the
solution to the incentive problem under η0.  Hence, there is no downside in disclosing y1.
Notably, this result generalizes to settings where η0 generates multiple performance measures
but discloses no information and where η1 is identical to η0 except that it publicly reports either
one or several of the performance measures that are generated by η0.  Likewise, the result
generalizes to settings where multiple tasks are assigned to the agent and contractible
information is publicly reported.  Intuitively, both, the disclosure of a single or multiple
performance measures result in a market price that varies with disclosed information, thus
introducing an option for the principal to indirectly contract on this information; on the other
hand, abandoning the option does not prevent the principal from offering the same incentive
contract to the agent as under η0.
3.2 Disclosing Supplemental Non-contractible Information
The preceding analysis provides a simple model to illustrate that disclosing a single performance
16 Interestingly, since price is an equivalent statistic to soft information, the expected net payoff to the principal is
identical to the expected surplus if y1 were directly contractible.
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measure is weakly beneficial to the principal.  In this subsection we consider a simple setting
where disclosing supplemental, non-contractible information can be detrimental to the principal.
To illustrate this result, we extend the previous model by assuming that there are two non-
contractible performance measures yi ' m a % ρixgx % gμi, i'1,2, where gμi ~ N(0,σμi2), Cov[gμi,gx]
' 0, and Cov[gμ1,gμ2] ' ρ σμ1σμ2.17  While η1 only discloses the initial performance measure (i.e.,
y1), η2 also discloses a supplemental performance measure (i.e., y1 and y2).  Thus, V†(y2|η1)
reflects the disclosure value of supplemental non-contractible information (i.e., the value of
additional, publicly reported soft information).  Suppose that the supplemental signal is
(conditionally) informative about the agent’s actions.  Moreover, if this signal is also
contractible, using it in the contract with the agent is (weakly) beneficial to the principal. 
However, additional, publicly reported non-contractible information can yield starkly different
results.  
3.2.1 Price-relevance
Even if the supplemental signal is (conditionally) informative about the agent’s action, investors
will not always use this information in their pricing.  Lemma 2 summarizes conditions under
which y2 is not used in the price setting process.
Lemma 2: Investors do not use supplemental information y2 to set the price if (ρ2x σμ1 ! ρ ρ1x
σμ2) σμ1 ' 0.  This condition holds, for example, if:
(i) both signals are not informative about the firm’s terminal payoff (i.e., ρ1x ' ρ2x ' 0);
(ii) the supplemental signal is not informative about either the firm’s terminal payoff or
the measurement error of the initial signal (i.e., ρ2x ' ρ ' 0);
(iii) the initial signal is informative about the firm’s terminal payoff and contains no
measurement error (i.e., ρ1x … 0 and σμ12 ' 0);
17 Assuming that y2 has the same sensitivity to the agent’s action as y1 (i.e., ME[y1]/Ma ' ME[y2]/Ma) is without loss in
generality, since we can always generate an equivalent statistic ψ2 to y2N ' mNa % ρ2xgx % g2 with an arbitrary mN 0 ú, such thatψ2 has the same sensitivity as y1.
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(iv) both signals are equally informative about the firm’s terminal payoff and the
conditional measurement error of the initial signal is zero (i.e., ρ1x ' ρ2x and σμ1 ! ρ
σμ2 ' 0).
In general, y2 is not price relevant if y1 is a sufficient statistic for y1 and y2 with respect to x. 
In particular, in (i) and (ii), y2 is not informative about the firm’s terminal payoff.  Then, from
the market’s perspective, its only purpose is to reduce measurement noise that is included in y1. 
However, if y1 is not used in the first place (i.e., ρ1x ' 0) or y2 is not informative about y1’s
measurement error (ρ ' 0), y2 will not be considered in price setting.  Interestingly, this includes
the special case of a noiseless performance measure (i.e., σ22 ' 0).  Case (iii) characterizes a
setting where y1 perfectly reveals x such that, consequently, price perfectly reflects terminal
payoffs.  Finally, case (iv) describes a setting where y2 is merely a garbling of y1.
If any condition outlined in Lemma 2 holds, y2 is not used to derive the firm’s price.  Then,
given that y2 is non-contractible information, the principal can neither directly nor indirectly use
the supplemental performance measure in the contract with the agent.  
Assuming that neither condition outlined in Lemma 2 holds, using the model’s
parameterization in (1a) and (1b) gives the sensitivity of market price to the agent’s action (i.e.,
ME[π|η2]/Ma) and price volatility (i.e., σπ2(η2)), which are characterized by
ME[π|η2]/Ma ' Q!1 m (ρ1xσμ22 ! ρ (ρ1x % ρ2x) σμ1σμ2 % ρ2xσμ12) σx2, (9a)
σπ2(η2) ' Q!1 (ρ1x2σμ22 ! 2 ρ ρ1x ρ2x σμ1σμ2 % ρ2x2σμ12) σx4, (9b)
where Q / (ρ1x2σx2 % σμ12)(ρ2x2σx2 % σμ22) ! (ρ1xρ2xσx2 % ρ σμ1σμ2)2.  Observe that both figures are key
to the solution of the principal’s decision problem under η2.
3.2.2 Disclosure Value
Since both performance measures yi, i'1,2, are non-contractible, the solution to the principal’s
problem with η1 is the same as the solution in Section 3.1 (Table 1.1).  In particular, the
principal’s expected net payoff is characterized by (T1.2f).  On the other hand, using the
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parameterization for η2 in (7b) gives the principal’s expected net payoff as
Π†(η2) ' ½ , (10)
where ME[π|η2]/Ma is given by (9a) and σπ2 is given by (9b).  Substituting (T1.2f) and (10) into
(8) and simplifying yields the value of disclosing y2, given disclosure of y1, as
V†(y2|η1) ' ½ . (11)
Suppose that the conditions outlined in Lemma 2 do not hold, i.e., supplemental information
is impounded in price.  Then, following (11), the sign of its disclosure value depends on the
market prices’ signal-to-noise ratios under η2 versus η1 (Kim and Suh 1991; Lambert 2001).  In
particular, disclosing supplemental information is beneficial to the principal if the signal-to-noise
ratio with η2 is larger than the signal-to-noise ratio with η1 (i.e., if ME[π|η2]/Ma / σπ > m / σ1).  In
general, given that the supplemental information is impounded in price, disclosure of y2 increases
price volatility (i.e., σπ2(η2) > σπ2(η1) ' σ12 if Lemma 2 does not hold), whereas the impact of
disclosure on the sensitivity of market price to the agent’s action is ambiguous.  Proposition 3
summarizes necessary and sufficient conditions under which disclosing supplemental
information y2 is detrimental to the principal. 
Proposition 3: A divergent informativeness of the initial versus the supplemental
performance measure regarding the firm’s terminal payoff is a necessary condition for a
negative value of supplemental, publicly reported information (i.e., ρ1x…ρ2x).  Sufficient
conditions for a negative disclosure value include, for example, modest measurement error
in the initial performance measure and a relatively more payoff-informative supplemental
performance measure with
(i) no measurement error (i.e., σμ12 < (1!ρ1x2) σx2, ρ2x2 > ρ1x2 % σμ12/σx2, and σμ2 ' 0);
(ii) unrelated measurement error (i.e., σμ12 < (1!2 ρ1x/ρ2x) σμ22 % (ρ2x2!ρ1x2) σx2, ρ2x > 2 ρ1x >
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0, and ρ ' 0).
In settings (i) and (ii), volatility increases with disclosure because (a) the initial performance
measure is subject to only modest measurement error and (b) the supplemental performance
measure is substantially more informative about terminal payoffs than the initial signal.18  If the
supplemental performance measure is substantially more informative about the firm’s terminal
payoff than the initial performance measure, investors assign a relatively larger weight to the
former signal (i.e., α2* versus α1*), yielding a lower sensitivity of price to the agent’s action. 
Consequently, the additional, publicly reported signal decreases the signal-to-noise ratio of
market price and, according to (11), has a negative disclosure value.  
Fundamental to Proposition 3 is that investors are ignorant regarding the impact of their
pricing on the principal’s expected net payoff.  Intuitively, whereas the principal would assign
a relatively larger weight to y1 (because of its modest measurement error), investors place a
relatively larger weight on y2 (because of its higher payoff informativeness).  It is this divergence
in the aggregation of the performance measures (Paul 1992, Feltham and Xie 1994) that causes
the negative disclosure value.  Interestingly, this chain of reasoning holds for the case where the
supplemental signal possesses no measurement error (Proposition 3 (i)) and the case where its
measurement error is unrelated to the measurement error of the initial signal (Proposition 3
(ii)).19
Observe that Proposition 3 holds as long as market price is used as the sole performance
measure in the agent’s contract.  Key to this result is that investors aggregate information
regardless of its contractibility, i.e., the weight αi* assigned to yi is not affected by this signal’s
contractibility.  On the other hand, if either the initial or the supplemental performance measure
18 Observe that volatility increases in the performance measure’s payoff informativeness.  Intuitively, for a more
informative signal, price varies to a larger extent with the disclosed signal.
19 Note that these additional conditions affect the cutoff-values for the measurement error of the initial signal and the
supplemental signal’s payoff informativeness.
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is contractible, disclosure value for the supplemental signal will be non-negative.  With at least
one contractible performance measure, by varying the incentive rate for this signal the principal
can induce any relative weights for both, the contractible signal and market price, including the
weights that she would choose if both signals were contractible.
While Section 3 considered the disclosure of supplemental non-contractible information in
a single-task setting, we investigate the value of supplemental non-contractible information in
a multi-task setting in the following section.  Finally, Section 5 considers the disclosure value
of contractible information, given that non-contractible information is publicly reported.
4. VALUE OF DISCLOSURE IN A TWO-TASK SETTING
We now consider a simple model that starkly illustrates how, in a multi-task setting, supplemen-
tal, publicly reported non-contractible information can be detrimental to the principal.  While in
previous sections the principal only had to care about setting effort-level incentives, she also
cares about the allocation of effort across different tasks in a multi-task setting.  To keep the
model as simple as possible, we extend the previous model by considering a second (potentially)
productive task, such that
x ' b1 a1 % b2 a2 % gx,
where ai 0 ú represents the agent’s choice of effort level and bi 0 ú represents the productivity
of the agent’s effort in task i, i ' 1,2.  We assume the agent’s personal cost of effort κ(a1,a2) is 
κ(a) ' ½ (a12 % a22).
Let π(ηk) ' μk1 a1 % μk2 a2 % gkπ represent market price given information system ηk, k'1,2,
where the sensitivity to the agent’s actions (i.e., μk1 and μk2) and the noise in price (i.e., gkπ) all
depend on ηk.  More specifically, the parameters depend on the aggregation weights implied by
ηk.  Using this parameterization in (2) and (5), Table 1.2 summarizes the agent’s certainty
equivalent, his choice of effort, the principal’s unconstrained decision problem, the optimal
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incentive rate, and the principal’s expected net payoff.
Table 1.2
Two-task Agency Conflict
CE(z,a) ' f % vkπ (πo % μk1 a1 % μk2 a2) ! ½ (a12 % a22) ! ½ r vkπ2 σkπ2, (T2a)
ai†(vπ) ' μki vkπ, i ' 1,2, (T2b)
Π(vπ,η) ' (b1 μk1 % b2 μk2) vkπ ! ½ (μk12 % μk22) vπ2 ! ½ r vπ2 σπ2, (T2c)
vπ† ' Qk!1 (b1 μk1 % b2 μk2), (T2d)
Π†(η) ' ½ Qk!1 (b1 μk1 % b2 μk2) 2, (T2e)
with Qk ' μk12 % μk22 % r σπ2
The solution to our two-task problem with a single performance measure is equivalent to
Feltham/ Xie (1994).  Our focus, however, is the value of disclosure when price is used as a
performance measure.  We assume that the two actions a1 and a2 influence two aggregate, non-
contractible performance measures yi ' mi1a1 % mi2a2 % ρixgx % gμi,  i'1,2, where gμi ~ N(0,σμi2),
Cov[gμi,gx] ' 0, and Cov[gμ1,gμ2] ' ρ σμ1σμ2.20  As in the previous model, while η1 only discloses
an initial performance measure (i.e., y1), η2 also discloses a supplemental performance measure
(i.e., y1 and y2).  Hence, V†(y2|η1) continues to reflect the disclosure value of supplemental non-
contractible information.
Note that Lemma 2 continues to apply in this setting.  Key to this result is that investors are
only interested in the signals’ payoff-informativeness, which is not affected by the agent’s effort
choices.  More generally, while the weight for y1 under η1 is given by α* ' (ρ1x2 % σμ12/σx2)!1 ρ1x
(see Table 1.1), using (1a), with η2 the weights for both signals are given by
α1* ' Q!1 (ρ1x σμ2 ! ρ ρ2x σμ1) σμ2 σx2, (12a)
α2* ' Q!1 (ρ2x σμ1 ! ρ ρ1x σμ2) σμ1 σx2, (12b)
where Q / (ρ1x2σx2 % σμ12)(ρ2x2σx2 % σμ22) ! (ρ1xρ2xσx2 % ρ σμ1σμ2)2.  Applying these weights to the
performance measures determines how the agent’s actions influence market price.
20 For simplicity, mij $ 0, i, j ' 1,2.
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Subsequently, to illustrate our results, we first consider a setting where the agent is risk-
neutral (Subsection 4.1) before considering the setting with a risk-averse agent (Subsection 4.2).
4.1 Disclosure Value with a Two-task Risk-neutral Agent
With a risk-neutral agent, the principal’s objective is to motivate an efficient effort allocation
across tasks.  Note that if the gross payoff to the principal is non-contractible information, then
risk neutrality is not sufficient to achieve the first-best result (Feltham and Xie 1994).  Moreover,
with both information systems η1 and η2, given non-contractible performance measures y1 and
y2, market price is the sole contractible performance measure.  Substituting r 6 0 in (T2e) yields
the principal’s expected net payoff, given by
Π†(ηk) ' ½ Qk!1 (b1 μk1 % b2 μk2)2, k'1,2, (13)
with Qk / μk12 % μk22.  Substituting (13) for k ' 1,2 into (8) and simplifying yields the value of the
additional, publicly reported performance measure y2, i.e., 
V†(y2|η1) ' ½ Q1!1Q2!1 A12 [Ab1 (b1μ21 % b2μ22) % Ab2 (b1μ11 % b2μ12)], (14)
where Abk / b1μk2 ! b2μk1 is the measure of non-congruity for market price π(ηk), relative to the
firm’s terminal payoff, and A12 / μ12μ21 ! μ11μ22 is the measure of alignment between market
prices π(η1) and π(η2) as implied by information system ηk (Feltham and Wu 2000).
Disclosure value of y2 depends in a non-trivial way on the measures of non-congruity for the
two information systems.21  For example, if the market price that is induced by the initial
performance measure is perfectly congruent (i.e., if Ab1 ' 0), (14) simplifies to V†(y2|η1) '
!½Q2!1Ab22 # 0.  Then, disclosing a supplemental performance measure that yields a non-
congruent price (i.e., a signal with Ab2 … 0) is detrimental to the principal.  Key to this result is
that risk neutrality and a perfectly congruent market price under η1 are sufficient to achieve the
first-best result.  On the other hand, while disclosing a supplemental performance measure
improves market price’s informativeness regarding the firm’s terminal payoff, the expected net
21 Note that the two measures of non-congruity and the measure of alignment are functionally related.
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payoff to the principal declines if this signal is not congruent.  Secondly, disclosing a
supplemental performance measure is of no value to the principal if it is perfectly aligned with
the initial signal (i.e., if A12 ' 0).  Given two aligned public signals, market price’s measure of
non-congruity is identical to the non-congruity for either signal.  With risk neutrality, however,
price congruency is the single driver of inefficiencies in the agency.
More generally, price congruency depends on the weights assigned to public information. 
Using the signals’ weights under η1 and η2 (Table 1.1, (12a), and (12b)) in (1a) yields a
functional relation between market price, the agent’s actions, and payoff and measurement noise. 
Table 1.3 summarizes these relations for η1 and η2 along with expressions for the price sensitivity
to the agent’s actions.
Table 1.3
Market Price and Price Sensitivity Under η1 and η2
η1 - disclosure of y1
π(η1)' πo(η1) %  (ρ1x2 % σμ12/σx2)!1 ρ1x m11 a1 % (ρ1x2 % σμ12/σx2)!1 ρ1x m12 a2 % α* (ρ1xgx % gμ1),(T3.1a)
μ11 / (ρ1x2 % σμ12/σx2)!1 ρ1x m11, and μ12 / (ρ1x2 % σμ12/σx2)!1 ρ1x m12. (T3.1b)
η2 - disclosure of y1 and y2
π(η2) ' πo(η2) % Q!1 [(ρ1x σμ2 ! ρ ρ2x σμ1) σμ2 m11 % (ρ2x σμ1 ! ρ ρ1x σμ2) σμ1 m21] σx2 a1 
% Q!1 [(ρ1x σμ2 ! ρ ρ2x σμ1) σμ2 m12 % (ρ2x σμ1 ! ρ ρ1x σμ2) σμ1 m22] σx2 a2
% Q!1 [ρ1x2 σμ22 ! ρ ρ1x ρ2x σμ1 σμ2 % ρ2x2 σμ12 ! ρ ρ1x ρ2x σμ1 σμ2] σx2 gx
% Q!1 σx2 [(ρ1x σμ2 ! ρ ρ2x σμ1) σμ2 gμ1 % (ρ2x σμ1 ! ρ ρ1x σμ2) σμ1 gμ2], (T3.2a)
μ21 / Q!1 [(ρ1x σμ2 ! ρ ρ2x σμ1) σμ2 m11 % (ρ2x σμ1 ! ρ ρ1x σμ2) σμ1 m21] σx2, and (T3.2b)
μ22 / Q!1 [(ρ1x σμ2 ! ρ ρ2x σμ1) σμ2 m12 % (ρ2x σμ1 ! ρ ρ1x σμ2) σμ1 m22] σx2, (T3.2c)
with Q / (ρ1x2σx2 % σμ12)(ρ2x2σx2 % σμ22) ! (ρ1xρ2xσx2 % ρ σμ1σμ2)2.
Substituting (T3.1b), (T3.2b), and (T3.2c) into (14) yields a non-trivial expression for the
value of the additional, publicly reported performance measure y2.  The sign of V†(y2|η1) is, in
general, ambiguous.  Assuming that y2 is used by investors in pricing the firm’s terminal payoff
(i.e., assuming that Lemma 2 does not apply), while disclosing supplemental information y2 can
be beneficial to the principal, for emphasis, we focus on conditions under which the disclosure
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value will be negative:
Proposition 4: Suppose the agent is risk-neutral; an additional, publicly reported
performance measure has a negative disclosure value, for example, if:
(i) the initial performance measure is congruent with the terminal payoff (i.e., b1/b2 '
m11/m12);
(ii) one of the agent’s tasks is window dressing that only affects the supplemental
performance measure (i.e., bi ' m1i ' 0 and m2i … 0 for either i'1 or i'2);
(iii) measurement error is unrelated, the supplemental performance measure covaries
positively with the firm’s terminal payoff and responds relatively more strongly to effort
in the second task than does the initial performance measure, which, in turn, responds
relatively more strongly to effort in the second task than does the firm’s terminal payoff
(i.e., ρ ' 0, ρ2x > 0, and m21/m22 < m11/m12 < b1/b2).
Key to the negative disclosure value is the effect of disclosing y2 on the congruency of
market price, relative to the firm’s terminal payoff.  In particular, Proposition 4 identifies
sufficient conditions under which disclosure of both, the initial plus the supplemental
performance measure yields a less congruent price than does disclosure of merely the initial
performance measure.  For example, this holds in Proposition 4 (i) with a perfectly congruent
initial performance measure, implying a likewise perfectly congruent market price.  As a
corollary, disclosure value will be negative if the initial performance measure is perfectly
congruent in the sense that it does not respond to window dressing (Proposition 4 (ii)).  Finally,
Proposition 4 (iii) gives an example where the initial performance measure is non-congruent
(e.g., it responds relatively more strongly to effort in the second task than does the firm’s
terminal payoff), but the supplemental performance measure is even less congruent (e.g., the
relative response to effort in the second task is even more pronounced as compared with the
initial signal).  Here, any (positive) weighting of the two signals in the investors’ pricing yields
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a less congruent market price than the weighting of merely the initial performance measure.
Note that the latter result is in stark contrast to the result for a two-task setting with
contractible performance measures.  There, releasing a non-aligned second performance measure
is sufficient to achieve the first-best result.  While in the latter setting it is the principal who
selects the relative weights for the performance measures, in our setting it is the investors that
weight the signals via their pricing.  In particular, with contractible performance measures, the
principal selects a negative weight for the supplemental performance measure (yielding a
perfectly congruent total performance measure), while, due to the positive covariance between
the supplemental performance measure and the firm’s terminal payoff, the investors choose a
positive weight.
4.2 Disclosure Value with a Two-task Risk-averse Agent
We now consider a simple model that integrates both reasons for a negative disclosure value, i.e.,
the market price is either noisier or less congruent as a consequence of the disclosure of a
supplemental, non-contractible performance measure.  The agent controls two tasks and there
are two aggregate, non-contractible performance measures.  Hence, the model is the same as the
model in the previous subsection, except that the agent is risk averse.  For illustration, we assume
that the initial performance measure is perfectly congruent (i.e., Ab1 ' b1m12 ! b2m11 ' 0), the
supplemental performance measure, in general, responds differently to the second task (i.e., m21
' b1 and m22 > 0), the noise variables have unit variance (i.e., σx2 ' σμ12 ' σμ22 ' 1), and
measurement error is unrelated (i.e., ρ ' 0).  Proposition 5 characterizes two settings under which
disclosing supplemental information y2 will be detrimental to the principal.
Proposition 5: Suppose the agent is risk-averse; an additional, publicly reported perfor-
mance measure has a negative disclosure value, for example, if:
(i) the agent’s productivity is identical across tasks, the supplemental performance measure
responds more strongly to effort in the second task than does the initial measure, and
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both signals are equally but limitedly informative regarding the firm’s terminal payoff
(i.e., b1 ' b2 ' b, m22 > b, ρ1x' ρ2x' ρx, and ρx2 < ρx);
(ii) the agent’s second task is a window-dressing activity and the supplemental performance
measure strongly responds to this activity (i.e., b2 ' 0 and m222 > r ρx2!1 [2 ρ1x(1%ρ1x2) !
ρ2x(ρ1x2 % ρ2x2)]).
In the setting described by Proposition 5 (i), publicly reporting the supplemental performance
measure results in a non-congruent price.  However, given identical weights for both signals,
market price’s measure of non-congruity is unaffected by the payoff-informativeness of the two
signals (i.e., ρx).  On the contrary, price volatility is strictly monotonically increasing in payoff-
informativeness.  Thus, for a low informativeness, strong effort incentives (i.e., vπ†) result.  Given
that strong incentives amplify the consequences for the firm’s terminal payoff of differences in
the performance measure’s congruity, a large downside of disclosing the supplemental signal
exists, thus resulting in the negative disclosure value.
Likewise, in the setting of Proposition 5 (ii), price is non-congruent if supplemental
information is publicly reported.  On the other hand, depending on the signals’ payoff-
informativeness, disclosing both signals may yield a larger signal-to-noise ratio.  While a non-
congruent performance measure results in an inefficient effort allocation, the agent demands a
risk premium to bear the performance measure inaccuracy.  Therefore, disclosing supplemental
information is detrimental to the principal if the loss in inefficient effort allocation exceeds the
gains in risk premium.  This is the case, if the supplemental performance measure strongly
responds to the window-dressing activity.
5. VALUE OF DISCLOSING CONTRACTIBLE INFORMATION
So far, the analysis addressed the value of supplemental, publicly reported non-contractible
information.  Subsequently, we will consider the value of disclosing contractible information in
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addition to other non-contractible information.  Introducing hard information to our model
provides the principal with an additional instrument to control the agent’s choice of effort, as she
can design a contract that includes both, the hard information and price.  To illustrate the
differences, we extend the model in Subsection 3.2 by considering a contractible performance
measure yc ' m a % ρcxgx % gμc plus two non-contractible performance measures yi ' m a % ρixgx
% gμi, i'1,2, where gμj ~ N(0,σμj2), j'1,2,c, Cov[gμj,gx] ' 0, Cov[gμ1,gμ2] ' ρ σμ1σμ2, and Cov[gμi,gμc]
' ρci σμcσμi.  While η2 publicly reports both non-contractible performance measures (i.e., y1 and
y2), η3 also discloses the contractible performance measure (i.e., yc).  Thus, V†(yc|η2) reflects the
value of additional, publicly reported contractible information.  Analogue to Section 2 we will
first treat price as a generic performance measure and substitute the respective parameters
subsequently.  Again, let  π(ηk) ' μk a % gkπ represent market price given information system ηk,
k'2,3.  The agent’s compensation w, given price π, contractible information yc, and contract z
is given by
w(π,yc,z) ' f % vπ π % vc yc.
Substituting this expression into (2) provides following characterization of the agent’s
certainty equivalent,
CE(z,a) ' f % vπ (πo % μk a) % vc mc a ! ½ a2 ! ½ r (vπ2 σkπ2 % vc2 σc2 % 2 vc vπ σckπ),
where σckπ / Cov[πk,yc] is the correlation between price πk and the contractible performance
measure yc.  Table 1.4 summarizes the agent’s effort choice, the principal’s unconstrained
decision problem, the optimal incentive rate, and the principal’s expected net payoff.  Again, the
solution to the principal’s problem with two performance measures equals that in Feltham/ Xie
(1994) with two generic performance measures.  Here, the principal uses all available measures
to most efficiently balance effort incentives and risk she imposes on the agent.  
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Table 1.4
Agency Conflict with Price and one Contractible Measure
a†(vπ) ' μk vkπ % mc vc, (T4a)
Π(vπ,η) ' b (μk vkπ % mc vc) ! ½ (μk vkπ % mc vc)2  ! ½ r (vπ2 σkπ2 % vc2 σc2 % 2 vc vπ σckπ), (T4b)
vπ† ' Qk!1 b (μk σc2 ! mc σckπ), (T4c)
vc† ' Qk!1 b (mc σkπ2 ! μk σckπ), (T4d)
Π†(η) ' ½ Qk!1 b2 (mc2 σkπ2 % μk2 σc2 ! 2 mc μk σckπ), (T4e)
with Qk ' mc2 σkπ2 % μk2 σc2 ! 2 mc μk σckπ % r (σc2 σπ2 ! σckπ)
Note that, following Proposition 2, disclosing a single non-contractible performance measure
has no value to the principal.  Likewise, disclosing contractible information is, in general, of no
value if the performance measure is publicly reported in addition to a single non-contractible
performance measure.22  Key to this result is that the principal can always use the contractible
performance measure to undo this signal’s impact on market price; the “filtered” market price,
however, is an equivalent statistic to market price in the setting where the contractible
performance measure is not publicly reported.  However, disclosing a contractible performance
measure in addition to multiple non-contractible performance measures yields starkly different
results.
Similar to Subsection 3.2, using the model’s parameterization in (1a), Lemma 3 summarizes
conditions under which yc is not used in the price setting process.
Lemma 3: The capital market does not use supplemental information yc to set the price if 
ρcx ' (1!ρ2)!1 [(ρc2 ! ρ ρc1) ρ2x/σμ2 % (ρc1 ! ρ ρc2) ρ1x/σμ1] σμc.
This condition holds, for example, if:
(i) all three signals are not informative about the terminal payoff (i.e., ρ1x ' ρ2x ' ρcx ' 0);
(ii) the supplemental signal is not informative about either the firm’s terminal payoff or the
measurement error of the initial signals (i.e., ρc1 ' ρc2 ' ρcx ' 0);
22 The only exception refers to the knife-edge case where the non-contractible information is no longer impounded
in price, given the disclosure of the contractible information.  Then, the principal is weakly worse off.
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(iii) at least one non-contractible signal is informative about the firm’s terminal payoff and
contains no measurement error (i.e., ρix … 0 and σμi2 ' 0 for i'1 or i'2);
(iv) the non-contractible signals are identical (i.e., ρ1x ' ρ2x, σμ1 ' σμ2, ρc1 ' ρc2, and ρ ' 1).
Observe the similarity between the conditions in Lemma 3 and those in Lemma 2.  More
specifically, the line of reasoning for Lemma 3 parallels the logic to Lemma 2.  In particular, if
any condition outlined in Lemma 3 holds, yc is not used to derive the firm’s price and the value
of disclosing yc is zero.  
Note that information systems η2 and η3 are identical except for the induced market price. 
Thus, the performance comparison of η2 and η3 relies on the sensitivity of market price to the
agent’s action and price’s (conditional) variance.  Similar to Subsection 3.2, given that
supplemental information is impounded in price, disclosure of yc (weakly) increases price
volatility (i.e., σπ2(η3) $ σπ2(η2) if Lemma 3 does not hold).  On the contrary, the impact of
disclosing yc on both, the sensitivity of market price and the correlation between market price
and the contractible performance measure, is ambiguous.  Hence, in general, publicly reporting
an additional contractible performance measure can be both beneficial and detrimental to the
principal.
Applying the model’s parameterization to (8), using (T4c), (T4d), and (T4e), results in an
expression for the disclosure value V†(yc|η2).  However, using this expression to identify cutoff-
values yields rather complex closed-form solutions.  Hence, we employ a numerical example to
demonstrate that, with multiple non-contractible performance measures, the principal can have
strict preferences regarding the disclosure of additional contractible information.
Figure 1.1 illustrates these preferences.  Here, m ' b ' 1, r ' 1, σμ1 ' σμ2 ' σμc ' σx ' 1, ρ1x
' 1/8, ρ2x ' ½, ρcx ' ρc1 ' ρc2 ' 1/10.
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Figure 1.1
Value of a Publicly Reported Contractible Performance Measure yc
Given the Disclosure of Two Non-contractible Performance Measures Under η2
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In the example, besides three knife-edge conditions, the principal is not indifferent regarding
the  disclosure of contractible information.  More specifically, the principal benefits from
publicly reporting yc if measurement error of the two non-contractible performance measures is
highly correlated (i.e., for large values of |ρ|).  With η2, for a relatively negative correlation, the
investors assign a negative weight to one signal, yielding a weak sensitivity of market price to
the agent’s action.  On the other hand, for a large positive correlation, a high volatility results. 
In both cases, disclosure of yc under η3 increases the sensitivity of market price to the agent’s
action, which is particularly beneficial in case of a relatively negative correlation.
Notably, unlike disclosure of a contractible performance measure in settings with either no
or merely a single publicly reported, non-contractible performance measure, the principal has
strict preferences for disclosing  contractible information in settings with multiple public, non-
contractible performance measures.  Then, the value of disclosing contractible information
depends on the information already available to the capital market.  Intuitively, disclosure affects
the investors’ inferences regarding the firm’s terminal payoff, the weights that they assign to the
disclosed performance measures and, as a consequence, the sensitivity and (conditional) variance
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of market price.  As the numerical example illustrates, the performance comparison of disclosure
versus non-disclosure can go either way.  Proposition 6 summarizes necessary conditions for the
principal to have a strict preference regarding the disclosure of an additional contractible
performance measure.
Proposition 6: Suppose that information system ηs is identical to information system ηo,
except for the additional disclosure of a contractible performance measure yc; necessary
conditions for the principal to have a strict preference regarding the disclosure or non-
disclosure of a contractible performance measure (i.e., V†(yc|ηo) … 0) include,
(i) ηo publicly reports at least two non-contractible performance measures;
(ii) disclosure of yc alters investors’ aggregation of information into price (i.e., αc*(ηs) … 0,
αi*(ηs) … αi*(ηo) for at least one i 0{1,2});
(iii) with ηo, the principal uses market price π in the contract with the agent (i.e., with ηo, 
 vπ* … 0).
Note that Proposition 6 carries forward to a multi-task setting.  There, altered weights imply
a (weak) change in the market price’s congruency with the firm’s terminal payoff.  Similarly, the
change in congruency can be beneficial as well as detrimental to the principal.  For example,
suppose agent risk-aversion is negligible.  Then, the value of disclosure will be negative if the
contractible performance measure and price are not aligned with ηo, but they are aligned with ηs.
As a corollary to Proposition 6, if the new information is price relevant (i.e., αc*(ηs) … 0), the
principal will have strict preferences regarding its disclosure.  However, while price informative-
ness weakly increases as a consequence of the additional information that is available to
investors, disclosing contractible information can leave the principal strictly worse off.
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6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we examine the economic consequences of disclosing different types of
information to the capital market.  Our study is motivated by the recently proposed focus on
decision-usefulness as the primary objective of financial accounting and the ongoing demand for
more disclosure of soft information.  In our analysis, market price serves as a performance
measure in the contract between a risk neutral principal and a risk and effort averse agent.  We
extend a standard multi-task LEN-model to include the firm’s market price and investigate the
relation between price efficiency and solution of an agency conflict.  More specifically, we
investigate the disclosure of additional soft and hard information from a stewardship perspective. 
We find that while publicly reported additional information improves price efficiency, the
impact of more disclosed information on the principal’s expected net payoff is ambiguous. 
Hence, we present a rationale for partial disclosure that is complementary to proprietary costs
or uncertainty concerning the quantity of information.  Contrary to much of the earlier work on
partial disclosure, rather than withholding information ex post because it draws a bad picture of
the firm (and thus leads to a lower stock-price), the principal commits ex ante (i.e., before the
information is generated) to not disclose the information.  In our setting, withholding information
is valuable because the contracting usefulness of market price decreases as a consequence of the
disclosure. 
Based on our findings, we conclude that stewardship and decision-usefulness are potentially
conflicting objectives of financial accounting.  This is consistent, e.g., with empirical evidence
provided by Gassen (2008).  Thus, abandoning stewardship as a separate objective of financial
accounting and mandating further disclosure of soft information by standard setters and
regulators can result in lower productivity and reduced firm value.  Also, firms can be compelled
to offset the negative consequences of mandatory disclosure by reducing their amount of
voluntary disclosure.  Likewise, it can be optimal for firms to disclose aggregated soft
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information (if possible) instead of detailed information.
 Our findings have implications for empiricists, standard setters, and regulators.  Given that
non-contractible information is not verifiable and, thus, prone to window dressing by managers,
disclosing (more) soft information will result in a re-allocation of effort from productive to non-
productive tasks.  Moreover, increasing the level of disclosure yields a noisier price.  Hence,
assuming a mandatory disclosure regime, we expect to observe a larger relative weight on
accounting earnings as compared to stock price after more comprehensive requirements for
disclosure of soft information are in effect.  In a similar vain, increased mandatory requirements
can result in a reduction of the amount of voluntary disclosure, including the disclosure of hard
information.  Finally, standard setters frequently change disclosure standards one at a time.  Our
results, however, indicate that the “value of a standard” crucially depends on the standards that
are already in place.  In general, adjusting a standard in the sense of increasing demand for
disclosing either hard or soft information can destroy firm value.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS
Proposition 1: Differentiating (6) with respect to vπ and solving the first order condition for vπ
gives (7a).  Substituting (7a) yields the principal’s expected net payoff as characterized by (7b)

Lemma 2:  Applying the model’s parameterization to (1a) yields the following weights that are
assigned to the two non-contractible signals by the investors:
α1* ' Q!1 (ρ1x σμ2 ! ρ ρ2x σμ1) σμ2 σx2, (A.1a)
α2* ' Q!1 (ρ2x σμ1 ! ρ ρ1x σμ2) σμ1 σx2, (A.1b)
where Q / (ρ1x2σx2 % σμ12)(ρ2x2σx2 % σμ22) ! (ρ1xρ2xσx2 % ρ σμ1σμ2)2.  Following (A.1b), the weight
assigned to the supplemental information y2 will be zero if (ρ2x σμ1 ! ρ ρ1x σμ2) σμ1 ' 0.  Settings
(i) to (iv) describe conditions under which the weight will be zero. 
Proposition 3: Substituting (9a), (9b), and ρ1x ' ρ2x ' ρx into (11) and simplifying yields the
value of disclosing y2, given disclosure of y1 as
V†(y2|η1) ' ½  $ 0,
with Q / (ρx2σx2 % σμ12)(ρx2σx2 % σμ22) ! (ρx2 σx2 % ρ σμ1σμ2)2.  Since V†(y2|η1) $ 0, ρ1x … ρ2x is a
necessary condition.  (i) Substituting (9a), (9b), and σμ2 ' 0 into (11) and simplifying yields
V†(y2|η1) ' ½ . (A.2)
The numerator in (A.2) is negative if σμ1 % (ρ1x2 ! ρ2x2) σx2 < 0.  Solving this condition for ρ2x2
yields the cutoff value for the payoff-informativeness of the second performance measure.  Since
ρ2x 0 [!1,1], this cutoff value must be strictly smaller than 1 for a non-empty solution set. 
Solving the latter condition for σμ12 results in the cutoff value for the measurement error of the
-42-
first performance measure.  (ii) Substituting (9a), (9b), and σμ2 ' 0 into (11) and simplifying
yields
V†(y2|η1) ' ½ , (A.3)
where Q ' ρ1x2 σμ22 σx2 % σμ12(σμ22 % ρ2x2 σx2).  The denominator in (A.3) is positive; the numerator
is negative if
σ12 [2 ρ1x σμ22 % ρ2x(σμ12 ! σμ22 % (ρ1x2 ! ρ2x2)σx2)] < 2 ρ1x2 (ρ2x ! ρ1x) σμ22 σx2. (A.4)
For ρ2x > ρ1x > 0, the right hand side of (A.4) is positive.  Thus, the numerator is negative if the
left hand side of (A.4) is negative, i.e., 
2 ρ1x σμ22 % ρ2x(σμ12 ! σμ22 % (ρ1x2 ! ρ2x2)σx2) < 0.
Solving the latter condition for σμ12 yields the cutoff value for the measurement error of the first
performance measure.  Finally, for ρ2x > 2 ρ1x this cutoff value is positive, yielding a non-empty
solution set. 
Propositions 4: (i) First, substitute (T3.1b), (T3.2b), and (T3.2c) into (14) to obtain an
expression for the value of the additional, publicly reported performance measure.  (i)
Substituting m11/m12 ' b1/b2 yields
V†(y2|η1) ' ! ½ Q!1 b12 (b1m22 ! b2m21)2 σμ12 (ρ2x σμ1 ! ρ ρ1x σμ2)2 # 0. (A.5)
Interestingly, the value is zero, e.g., if the second performance measure is perfectly congruent
with the firm’s terminal payoff (i.e., b1/b2 ' m21/m22) and if the second performance measure is
not impounded in the price (i.e., ρ2x σμ1 ! ρ ρ1x σμ2 ' 0, see Lemma 2).  (ii) For example,
substituting b2 ' m12 ' 0 into the expression for disclosure value yields
V†(y2|η1) ' !½ ,
which is non-positive.  In particular, disclosure value will be negative if the supplemental
information is impounded in the price.  (iii) Substituting ρ ' 0 into the expression for disclosure
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value yields
V†(y2|η1) '
 !½ ,
where Λ12 ' m11m22 ! m12m21, Λb1 ' b1m12 ! b2m11, and Λb2 ' b1m22 ! b2m21 are the measures of
alignment and non-congruity, respectively, for the non-contractible performance measures. 
Disclosure value will be negative if Λ12 > 0, Λb1 > 0, Λb2 > 0, and ρ2x > 0.  Evaluation of the
conditions for the measures of alignment and non-congruity yields the relation of the sensitivities
of the performance measures and the tasks’ productivity. 
Propositions 5: Substituting the model’s parameterization into (7b) and (8) yields an expression
for the value of the additional, publicly reported performance measure.  (i) Substituting b1 ' b2
' b and ρ1x ' ρ2x ' ρx results in the expression for the disclosure value for this setting.  The
disclosure value is negative if
ρx2 < ρx / ,
where ρx ' ρx yields V†(y2|η1) ' 0.  Finally, m22 > b ensures that the numerator of the above
expression is positive.  (ii) Substituting b2 ' 0 in the expression for the disclosure value, setting
the numerator equal to zero  and solving the equation for m222 yields
m222 / m222 ' r ρx2!1 [2 ρ1x(1%ρ1x2) ! ρ2x(ρ1x2 % ρ2x2)].
The slope of V†(y1|η2) at m222 / m222 is negative; thus, disclosure value is negative if m222 > m222.

Lemma 3:  Applying the model’s parameterization to (1a) yields the following weights that are
assigned to the contractible signal yc and the two non-contractible signals yi, i'1,2 by the
investors:
αc* ' Q!1 [(1 ! ρ2)ρcx σμ1 σμ2 ! ((ρc1 ! ρ ρc2)ρ1x σμ2 % (ρc2 ! ρ ρc1)ρ2x σμ1)σc] σμ1 σμ2 σx2, (A.6a)
-44-
α1* ' Q!1 [(1 ! ρc22)ρ1x σμ2 σc ! ((ρc1 ! ρ ρc2)ρcx σμ2 % (ρ ! ρc1ρc2)ρ2x σc)σμ1] σμ2 σc σx2, (A.6b)
α2* ' Q!1 [(1 ! ρc12)ρ2x σμ1 σc ! ((ρc2 ! ρ ρc1)ρcx σμ1 % (ρ ! ρc1ρc2)ρ1x σc)σμ2] σμ1 σc σx2, (A.6c)
where Q is the determinant of Σp.  Following (A.6a), the weight assigned to the supplemental
contractible  information yc will be zero if (1 ! ρ2)ρcx σμ1 σμ2 ! ((ρc1 ! ρ ρc2)ρ1x σμ2 % (ρc2 ! ρ ρc1)ρ2x
σμ1)σc ' 0.  Settings (i) to (iv) describe conditions under which the weight will be zero. 
Proposition 6: Proof is by contradiction.  (i) If there is only a single publicly reported non-
contractible signal, by subtracting appropriately weighted contractible performance measures,
the principal obtains a filtered market price that only reflects the non-contractible information. 
This result holds for an arbitrary number of disclosed contractible performance measures. 
Therefore, disclosure does not change the characteristics of the set of contractible performance
measures.  (ii) Suppose that disclosure does not affect investors’ aggregation of information into
price.  Then, the principal can filter out the impact of the additional, contractible information
from market price and obtains a filtered price that is an equivalent statistic to the initial market
price where the supplemental information is not disclosed.  (iii) If the principal does not initially
use market price in the contract with the agent, disclosure will not deteriorate the characteristics
of the set of contractible performance measures.  Here, disclosure value is non-negative. 
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ESSAY 2:
TRANSIENT INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, 
INCENTIVES, AND DISCLOSURE*
* The paper was written with Christian Hofmann (University of Mannheim).
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1. INTRODUCTION
The composition of a firm’s investor base seems to have a significant influence on various
characteristics of the firm itself.  As institutional ownership of common stock constantly
increased over the years, institutions now control more than half of the equity market (e.g.,
Almazan/ Hartzell/ Starks 2005, Gompers/ Metrick 2001, Kang/ Liu 2008).  With some estimates
even reaching up to over 70% (Gillan/ Starks 2007), the influence these investors have on the
way corporations are led and organized attracted academic interest.  Findings indicate that
institutional investors influence firms’ corporate governance through different channels, directly
by monitoring the management and indirectly through trading of the firms’ shares (Gillan/ Starks
2007 provide an overview of the evolution of shareholder activism).  First, compared to diverse
individual investors, institutions, as specialized blockholders of companies’ shares, are better
able to directly monitor the firms’ management and, hence, mitigate the agency problem between
shareholders and managers (e.g., Hartzell/ Starks 2003). A second channel that has been
identified is the trading behavior of institutional investors (e.g., Ferreira/ Laux/ Markarian 2008,
Smith/ Swan 2008).  Due to the possibly large amount of shares these investors hold their trading
decisions can influence stock prices, which might have disciplinary effects on management
through stock based compensation and an increased probability of being replaced after large sell-
offs by institutional investors (Gillan/ Starks 2007, 56).
 While researchers and practitioners seem to agree that institutional investors have an
influence on the companies in which they hold a large fraction of shares, the assumed influence
ranges from overemphasizing short-term earnings  to helping build long-term value by actively
taking part in the firm.  Bushee (1998 and 2001) showed that while institutional investors on
average focus on long-term value, a certain group of institutional investors has a short-term
investment horizon.  This group of institutional investors is indicated by a high portfolio turnover
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as well as highly diversified portfolio holdings and is classified as transient institutions.1 
Empirical studies show that the presence of transient institutions as firms’ investors leads to an
overweighting of near-term earnings in price (which induces incentives for the management to
increase earnings, potentially at the cost of long-term value) and excess volatility in the stock
price (see Bushee 2004).  Furthermore, current research provides evidence that boards of
directors account for implicit incentives (arising by transient institution’s trading) in CEO
compensation contracts by altering the weight on earnings in cash bonuses (Dikolli/ Sedatole/
Kulp 2009).
A different set of studies indicates that transient institutions have superior information about
future stock returns, they actively trade on this information (Hogan/ Grant 2009, Yan/ Zhang
2009), and some of the information is impounded into price (e.g. Piotroski/ Roulstone 2003). 
It is widely believed that a higher informativeness of the stock price with regard to future cash
flows makes it a better performance measure to control a company’s management.  Following
this rationale the existence of transient institutions as blockholders of a firm’s shares should,
ceteris paribus, increase the informativeness of price and, hence, make the stock price more
valuable as a performance measure in management’s compensation contracts.  Kang/ Liu (2008)
provide empirical results that support this intuition by showing that pay-performance sensitivity
(PPS) of management’s compensation is positively related to the probability of insider trading. 
Smith/ Swan (2008) provide further support by showing that institutional trading increases PPS. 
Even though they support the notion that institutional trading increases the informativeness of
price, Ferreira/ Laux/ Markarian (2008) find that institutional trading is negatively related to
PPS.  They argue that their results provide evidence for institutional trading (and therefore a
more informative price) acting as a substitute to pay for performance.
While information that is published will be fully incorporated into price, it will be only
1 Bushee (1998, 307).
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partially recognized in price if it is communicated indirectly through the trading decisions of
some informed investors (see, e.g., Grossman/ Stiglitz 1980, Kyle 1985).  Following this
rationale, shareholders who are interested in monitoring their company’s management to increase
the long-term value of the company should commit to publish information that is valuable for
performance measurement.  Hollander et al. (2008) support this by showing that firms’ levels
of disclosure are positively related to the PPS of managerial compensation.  On the other hand,
not disclosing information or only disclosing it to a certain group of investors enables (some)
current shareholders to trade on this information and possibly gain from these trades. 
Accordingly, Bushee et al. (2003) find that firms with higher institutional ownership tend to
provide closed rather than open conference calls (hence, only granting a certain group of their
shareholders access to some information).  Hollander et al. (2008) present findings which suggest
that firms with high institutional ownership prefer less voluntary disclosure.  Finally, Bushee
(2004) summarizes his work on different kinds of investors and states that transient institutions
are attracted to companies with investor relation activities geared towards forward-looking
information, persistent earnings growth (so that surprises have greater impact) and greater
liquidity (which allows to move in and out of stocks).
The literature mentioned above seems to support Core (2001) who emphasizes the
endogenous relationship between a firm’s disclosure policy and its management’s incentives. 
On the one hand we can observe that informed trading increases price informativeness, making
price a more valuable performance measure.  On the other hand it was shown that transient
institutional investors focus on short-term earnings and prefer lower levels of disclosure.  We
add to the literature by studying the interplay of market microstructure (e.g., the liquidity
available in the market), investor characteristics (e.g., their trading horizon), and managerial
incentives.  Theoretical research shows that due to different objectives of prospective and current
investors, a more informative price with regard to future stock returns does not have to provide
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better information regarding past effort choices (e.g. Feltham/ Xie 1994, Heinle/ Hofmann 2009). 
Incorporating the possibility that shareholders might not hold all their shares in the long run, we
can show that even in situations where disclosing information would enhance the informative-
ness of stock price with regard to both, management’s effort choices and future returns, it might
be withheld.  The choice whether to disclose or not depends on the market microstructure and
the characteristics of the performance measure.  In this choice, the transient investor trades off
an improved solution to the stewardship problem (long-term value) and expected trading gains
(short-term value).  And while a range of rational expectation models predict the informativeness
of the price to be independent of the liquidity noise2 we show that including the decision to
publish accounting information leads to a connection between informativeness and uncertainty.
Some other analytical studies investigate the combination of market microstructure and a
firm’s internal moral hazard problem.  Holmstrom/ Tirole (1993) focus on the production of
private information by an informed outside investor.  By endogenizing the information
acquisition activity they can show that (given an unchanged disclosure environment) the
informativeness of price increases with the amount of trading motivated by uncertain liquidity
needs.  Our results show that while in markets with low liquidity some information will be made
public the same does not hold true for high liquidity.  This leads to a reverted relationship
between liquidity and informativeness.  Baiman/ Verrecchia (1996) study a setting in which a
firm’s manager is able to obtain insider information and trade on this information.  In their
setting, disclosure always diminishes the amount of information about the manager’s action and
price as a performance measure becomes less valuable.  The disclosure decision trades off this
effect with an increased liquidity (and a decreasing cost of capital) following the announcement
of disclosure.  In contrast, empirical evidence suggests that information about managerial action
2 See, e.g., Baiman/ Verrecchia (1995) and Feltham/ Wu (2000).
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in price increases following firm’s disclosure3 and that “private information trading is most
evident when large positions in firms are taken by [...] large institutions” (Bushee/ Goodman
2004, 292).  While not including the market microstructure Bushman/ Indjejikian (1993) show
that in the light of solving the stewardship problem distorted accounting information might be
preferred.  This includes, first, noisy measures (to induce private information acquisition) and,
second, biased measures (to balance different managerial activities).  We include the liquidity
of the market and can show that the effectiveness of managerial incentives indirectly depend on
liquidity as it influences the investor’s disclosure and trading decisions.
In chapter 2 we describe the model under non-disclosure of the generated performance
report.  We then investigate the effect of disclosing the report and determine the value of
disclosure in chapter 3.  Here, we present conditions under which making the report public
decreases the expected utility of the transient investor because even though it would increase
long-term value the disclosure diminishes short-term trading profits.  We draw conclusions in
chapter 4.
2. INVESTOR’S PRIVATE INFORMATION
2.1 Basic Structure of the Model
At date 0, the principal, acting on behalf of the firm’s risk neutral shareholders4, hires an agent
to provide productive effort at date 1 in return for compensation at date 2.  The agent expends
personally costly effort that influences the payoff to the principal realized at date 3 and his
choice of effort level is represented by a.  The firm is priced on a capital market at date 2.  The
timing of events is illustrated in Figure 2.1.
3 See, e.g., Craighead/ Magnan/ Thorne (2004).
4 We will use the terms shareholder, principal, and (transient institutional) investor interchangeable throughout the
paper.
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Figure 2.1
Timeline
t=0 t=1 t=2 t=3
principal offers 
contract to the agent
agent chooses 
effort
accounting report is
produced and published
demand orders are
submitted
price is set
contract is settled
terminal value of the
firm is realized
To facilitate the further analysis we assume that at date 0 the principal offers the agent a
linear contract z ' (f,v), where f is the agent’s fixed wage and v the incentive rate for market price
p.  As a result, the agent’s compensation w, given price p and contract z, is
w(p,z) ' f % v p. 
We assume a linear relationship between the agent’s effort and the firm’s terminal payoff5,
i.e.,
x ' b a % gx,
where b is the productivity of the agent’s effort with respect to the terminal value of the firm, and
gx ~ N(0,σx2) represents uncontrollable events.
At date 2, a non-contractible report is released that is informative about the manager’s choice
of effort and the uncontrollable events that affect the firm’s payoff.  We assume a linear
relationship with respect to effort, i.e.,
y ' m a % gi,
m represents the sensitivity of the performance report to the agent’s effort level and gi a noise
term that captures uncertainty associated with the measurement of the agent’s actions.  The
accounting report imperfectly captures uncontrollable events that influence the output,
specifically we assume
5 Alternatively, one could also think of the firm’s future payoff as the firm’s stock price in the future.  We choose the
term payoff to distinguish stock price at date 2 from firm value at date 3.
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gi ' ρ gx % gμ
with Cov[gx,gμ] ' 0.
ρ represents the correlation of the performance measure to the output and gμ uncontrollable
events that affect the precision of the accounting system, with gμ ~ N(0,σμ2).  Thus, Var[y] '
Var[gi] / σi2 ' ρ2σx2 % σμ2, where ρ2σx2 is the output related noise inherent in the performance
measure.
2.2 Price Formation
We investigate the influence of an institutional investor’s trading opportunities on managerial
incentives.  For this reason we choose to model the capital market along the lines of Kyle (1985). 
Here, the market consists of three different groups of participants: First, current shareholders
who have access to the released report and trade based on their superior information.  Second,
uninformed traders who trade for liquidity reasons.  Third, competitive market makers who only
observe the total demand order and set the price equal to the expected value.  This setting is
descriptive of a situation in which one investor has superior information and has a relatively high
market share so that his trades have a significant impact on the quantity traded.  Contrary to the
capital market model of Grossman/ Stiglitz (1980) the informed investor accounts for his
influence on price in his trading strategy.6  The Grossman/ Stiglitz (1980) setting represents a
market with a large number of informed investors where the influence every single investor has
on price is negligible.  In our setting, knowing that demand is influenced by the informed trader
the market tries to infer the private information from the total demand order.  But as some
investors trade due to unknown liquidity needs and the individual demand orders are not
observable, the market makers can not glean all the information from demand.  
To further emphasize the informational advantage of the institutional investor we assume that
6 The insider’s behavior in the Kyle (1985) model is comparable to the behavior of a monopolist on a product market. 
In his production decision the monopolist takes hte influence his own produced quantity has on the price into consideration and
limits his production to increase the price.
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she can observe both accounting report y and the action a chosen by the agent.7  At t'2 the price
is set and the risk neutral informed investor chooses her trading strategy to maximize her
expected trading profits, conditional on the observed accounting report and the action chosen by
the agent, while also considering her influence on stock price.  Specifically, her expected utility
at t'2 is characterized by8
E[uI(x,p)|y,a] ' α0 E[x|y,a] % α1 (E[p|y,a] ! E[x|y,a]), (1)
with x ' x ! f ! v p.
x denotes the terminal value net of the granted compensation to the agent, α0 denotes the fraction
of the company’s shares the investor owns in t'0, and α1 denotes the fraction of the company’s
shares she sells in t'2.9
The competitive market makers set the price equal to the expected value of future returns,
conditional on all information they have.  To simplify the analysis we assume that if the firm
does not disclose report y the only available information is the total demand order d.  To preclude
market makers from making expected gains or losses, the price must satisfy the condition
p ' E[x|d]. (2)
Total demand d is the sum of the liquidity traders’ demand dL and the informed investors sales
α1 so that d '  dL ! α1.  While the liquidity traders’ demand is assumed to follow a normal
distribution, dL ~ N(0,σL2), the informed investor chooses her demand conditional on the
observed report.  As is usual in rational expectation equilibrium models, we assume that all
actors on the capital market expect linear pricing and trading rules, which are confirmed in
equilibrium. Hence,
7 We assume that both types of information (y and a) constitute “soft” information, i.e., non-verifiable information
which can not be used in a contract.  See Heinle/ Hofmann (2009) for a discussion of soft and hard information in agency
contracts.
8 As intertemporal consumption is not an issue, we assume that all actors do not discount future payoffs.
9 Note that we do not restrict the amount of shares the investor is trading, specifically, she could purchase further shares
of the company.  As is usual in the Kyle (1985) model, the market makers absorbe any over- or undersupply of shares such that
going short or long in the firm’s shares is possible.
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p ' πf % πd d, and (3a)
α1 ' θf % θy y (3b)
where πf and θf are fixed amounts of the share price and the share sales, respectively, πd is the
sensitivity with which the market reacts to demand orders (following Kyle 1985 πd-1 can be
interpreted as the market depth, i.e. “the order flow necessary to induce price to rise or fall by
one dollar”10), and θy is the sensitivity with which the transient investor reacts to the accounting
report.  Maximizing (1) with respect to α1 given that (2) holds leads to following characterization
of the equilibrium on the capital market.
Corollary 111: Given accounting report y, the market maker’s price function and the
informed investor’s trading strategy are characterized by
πf ' ((b ! m σL σi-1)  ! f % v πd α0) (1%v)-1, (4a)
πd ' ½ ρ σx2 (σL σi (1%v))-1, (4b)
θf ' (b ( !a)σL σi ! ( %a) m σL2) (ρ σx2)-1 % v α0 (1%v)-1, (4c)
θy ' ! σL /σi, (4d)
where  denotes the market makers’ expectation about the agent’s effort choice.
The equilibrium is similar to the well known results from Kyle (1985).  Here, the privately
informed investor trades more aggressively on her information when she can hide it better due
to higher uncertainty (σL2) about liquidity traders’ demand (as can be seen in 4d).  In her trading
strategy, the investor accounts for the influence of the agent’s effort choice on both the
accounting report (i.e., !( %a) m σL2) and production (i.e., b ( !a)σL σi).  While the investor can
observe the agent’s effort choice, it remains unobservable to the market.  The inclusion of the
market makers’ expectation concerning the effort choice in the investor’s trading strategy
displays that she tries to use her full information advantage against the market.  The equilibrium
10 Kyle (1985, 1319).
11 All Proofs can be found in Appendix A.
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has a further similarity to Holmstrom/ Tirole (1993), where all actors inlcude the influence of
the agent’s incentive compensation in their decision.  Different from Holmstrom/ Tirole (1993)
is that in our model the privately informed investor is initially endowed with some of the firm’s
shares.  Increasing the fraction of shares she sells will decrease the stock price and, hence,
decrease the incentive payment to the agent.  This, given the initial endowment and the
contractual weight on price, fixed effect is corrected for by the market makers in (4a).
The following subsections will investigate the compensation contract between investors and
the agent.  This contract will depend on the characteristics of price as a performance measure,
where the sensitivity of price with respect to the agents actions (ME[p]/Ma / mp) and the volatility
of the normalized stock price (Var[p] / σp2) are most important.  Lemma 1 characterizes the
market price of the firm and it’s characteristics in equilibrium.
Lemma 1: Given trading strategies and price formation as stated in (4a-d), the market value
of the firm, its variance and its sensitivity to the agent’s effort choice are given by
p ' (1%v)-1 [½ b ( %a) ! ½ m σL σi-1 ( !a) ! f % ½ ρ σx2 (σi-2 gi % (σL σi)-1 dL)], (5a)
σp2 ' ½ ρ2 σx4 [(1%v)2 σi2]-1, (5b)
mp ' ½ (b % m σL σi-1) (1%v)-1. (5c)
As stated above, the market includes the investor’s expected amount of trading in the price
formation, which leads to a price that is independent of the investor’s initial endowment with
shares.  Because both the investor and the market makers are interested in the terminal value of
the firm net of the agent’s compensation, the fixed fee f is deducted and price is scaled by (1%v)-
1.  As usual in Kyle-type models, the informed trader reveals exactly half of his information to
the market.  While the fixed fee to the agent is commonly known, all other parameters display
the information the market gathers from the total demand.  The agent’s productivity is weighted
with the average of the market’s expectation and the principal’s observation of the agent’s effort 
If the market makers’ expectation regarding the agent’s effort choice are met, the agent’s
- 59 -
influence on the accounting report is excluded from price.  The last term in (5a) displays the
effect the accounting report and the noise traders’ demand have on price.  An increase in demand
is interpreted by the market makers as positive inside information such that both the noise term
in the accounting report and the liquidity traders’ demand increase price.
The variance of stock price (5b) derives from two sources, namely the liquidity traders’
uncertain demand (i.e., dL) and the informed investor’s reaction (θy y) to the observed value of
the accounting report.  The market maker’s reaction to the total demand order weakens with an
increasing uncertainty about liquidity traders’ demand.  This leads the investor to trade more
aggressively on her superior information.  Similar to the original Kyle model, these two effects
exactly offset each other such that the variance of stock price is independent of the uncertainty
about liquidity.  If the accounting report is not informative about terminal value (i.e., ρ'0), the
market makers will not react to the demand order and the price will just be a constant (σp2 ' 0
if ρ'0).  On the other hand, if the accounting report is fully revealing output uncertainty (σμ2'0),
the variance of stock price equals half of the variance of terminal value (scaled by (1%v)-2)
As the market makers cannot observe the agent’s choice of effort a they form unconditional
expectations  regarding his choice.  Hence, the sensitivity of stock price with regard to the
agent’s action derives only through the transient investor’s trading decision who can observe the
actual effort choice (a†).  This is manifested in two terms: first, the informed investor reveals half
of his information about terminal value (½ b), second, the investor trades based on his
observation of the accounting report (½ m σL σi-1).  Both the variance of price and it’s sensitivity
to the agent’s actions are scaled by the incentive rate.
2.3 Agent’s Preferences
The agent chooses his effort level in t'1 to receive compensation in t'2.  We assume that the
agent’s preferences with regard to compensation and his level of effort are represented by a
negative exponential utility function, with
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uA(z,a) ' !exp[!r(w ! κ(a))],
where r is the coefficient of his absolute risk aversion and the personal cost of effort κ(a) is
assumed to be
κ(a) ' ½ a2.
Similar to Holmstrom/ Tirole (1993) and Calgano/ Heider (2008) we normalize the stock
price for contracting purposes such that
β ' (1%v) p,
' ½ b ( %a) ! ½ m σL σi-1 ( !a) ! f % ½ ρ σx2 σi-2 gi % ½ ρ σx2 (σL σi)-1 dL
This normalization is merely a linear transformation of stock price and, hence, has the same
information content as price itself.  However, the variance of the normalized price is independent
of the chosen incentive weight and such facilitates the following analysis.  While the fixed fee
is not affected by this transformation, the incentive weight on price and normalized price differ.
The agent’s compensation w, given normalized price β and contract z, is then
w(β,z) ' f % υ β,
with υ ' v (1%v)-1,
where υ is the incentive rate for the normalized market price β.  Maximizing the expected utility
is equivalent to maximizing the certainty equivalent, which is characterized by
CE(z,a) ' E[w|z,a] ! κ(a) ! ½ r Var[w|z] (6)
' f % υ mβ a ! ½ a2 ! ½ r υ2 σβ2 .
where mβ is the sensitivity of the normalized price to the agents actions (mβ / ME[β]/Ma ' ½ (b
% m σL σi-1)) and σβ2 is the volatility of the normalized stock price (σβ2 / Var[β] ' ½ ρ2σx4 σi-2). 
The agent chooses a to maximize his certainty equivalent.  Differentiating (6) with respect to a,
given contract z, provides the following characterization of the agent’s action choice:
a†(υ) ' υ mβ. (7)
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2.4 Principal's Contract Choice
We assume that the principal acts on behalf of the transient institutional investor.  This is
descriptive of a situation where the (1!α0) shares of the firm which are not held by the
institutional investor belong to atomistic shareholders who do not exercise any influence on the
board such that the contract with the CEO is written in the interest of the dominant institutional
investor.12
When the principal offers contract z to the agent, she has to take into account that the agent
provides non-contractible effort and only accepts the contract if he does not have a better
alternative.  The actions that are induced by z are characterized by (7).  Also, the agent will only
participate in the firm if his contract z is such that it provides him with his reservation wage,
which is scaled to equal zero, i.e.,
CE(z,a†) $ 0. (8)
The investor is assumed to be risk neutral with respect to the terminal value of the firm and her
trading gains.  She is interested in maximizing her expected utility, stemming from (i) the
terminal value of the firm and (ii) trading gains:
Π(a,z) ' E0[(α0 ! α1) (x ! f ! υ β) % α1 p |a,z]. (9)
The transient investor’s expected utility in t'0 is derived by the fraction of the net terminal value
of the firm she expects to hold, i.e., E0[(α0 ! α1) (x ! f ! υ β)], and the payment she expects to
receive for selling shares, i.e., E0[α1 p].  We denote the principal’s ex ante expected utility with
the index 0 to emphasize that while she chooses α1 as described in (3b), (4c), and (4d), her choice
will be conditioned on the information she observes in t'2.  Hence, in t'0, she forms an
(unconditional) expectation with regard to her later choice.
As depicted in (4c), the principal corrects for the agent’s first moment influence on the
12 Including other shareholders that influence the contract with the agent in our model would need a specification of,
first, their utility and, second, the process which determines the contract.  However, as in our model the agent’s actions can be
perfectly anticipated by the market and we do not distinguish between short-term and long-term effort, the contract chosen by
a transient investor will equal the choice of a dedicated investor.
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accounting report and trades based on the observation about risk.  Assuming that the market
makers can observe the contract between principal and agent, in equilibrium the expected action
choice will equal the solution to (7).  Even though the mean of all noise terms is zero, the
investor expects to benefit from her superior information.  This results because she can profit
from both positive and negative deviations from the mean by buying additional or selling more
shares.
In designing the contract, the principal incorporates that this choice influences the
expectations of the market concerning the agent’s effort.  She chooses z such as to maximize (9)
subject to (7), (8), and the expected equity market equilibrium.  Substituting (7) into (6),
choosing f such that CE(z,a†) ' 0, and substituting f †, a†(υ) ' υ mβ, (3a), and  (3b) into (9) gives
the principal’s unconstrained decision problem:
Π(υ,α0) ' α0 (b mβ υ ! ½ (mβ2 % r σβ2) υ2) % ½ ρ σx2 σL σi-1. (10)
The investor accounts for her full initial holding of the firm’s net terminal value, i.e., α0 (b
mβ υ ! ½ (mβ2 % r σβ2) υ2), as in equilibrium the expected stock price of the firm is equal to the
expected net terminal value, and, hence, neither selling nor buying shares changes the investor’s
fraction of the net terminal value.  However, the chance to profit from her informational
advantage increases her expected utility.  These possible trading gains, i.e., ½ ρ σx2 σL σi-1,
increase in the depth of the market.  The higher the uncertainty about liquidity traders’ demand,
the higher the expected trading gains.  More noise in demand enables the investor to better hide
her information which leads to more aggressive trading and higher expected profits.  Taking into
account all the effects of her contract choice, the solution to the principal’s problem is
characterized by Proposition 1.
Proposition 1: Given the price characterized in Corollary 1 and the principal’s unconstrained
decision problem in (10), the optimal incentive rate and the principal’s second-best expected net
payoff are
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υ† ' b mβ Q-1, (11a)
Π†(α0) ' ½ α0 b2 mβ2 Q-1 % ½ ρ σx2 σL σi-1, (11b)
with Q ' (mβ2 % r σβ2).
The incentive weight in (11a) displays the solution to a common principal-agent relationship
with a generic performance measure.  Note that the optimal incentive weight on price is
independent of the investor’s initial endowment with shares.  This indicates that the investor is
interested to most efficiently solve the agency problem, and is the result of a price that is
independent of the investor’s initial holdings.  Intuitively, the solution to maximizing the
expected value of the whole firm equals that for maximizing a share of the firm when receiving
the equal share of profits and costs.  This is the case because we abstract from any monitoring
activities or transaction costs when designing the contract.  Including either in our model would
lead to a situation where the institutional investor would have to bear the full costs of these
activities but would only receive a fraction of the benefits.
The second-best expected net payoff to the investor in (11b) is the sum of the expected net
profit of the agency relationship and of trading on the equity market.  As is usual, (11a) and the
first term in (11b) both depend on the sensitivity of the performance measure to the agent’s
action (“signal”) and the variance of the performance measure (“noise”).  In our setting these
parameters are determined endogenously through the equilibrium stock price.  Proposition 2
characterizes the signal-to-noise ratio of the normalized stock price.
Proposition 2: The signal-to-noise ratio of the normalized stock price is given by
mβ2/σβ2 ' ½ (b σi % m σL)2 (ρ2σx4)-1. (12)
As described above, the variance of price is independent of the unertainty about liquidity
traders’ demand.  However, increasing the latter leads to more aggressive trading by the investor
which positively influences the impact of the agent’s effort on price through its influence on the
accounting report.  This leads to the effect that the signal-to-noise ratio of the normalized stock
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price increases in the uncertainty about liquidity traders’ demand.  An increase in the
measurement noise of the report (i.e., an increase in σi while σx remains constant) also leads to
an increase in the signal-to-noise ratio.  The reason for this is different from the argumentation
above.  Both the variance and the sensitivity of stock price decrease in the measurement noise,
but the former effect dominates the latter.  When the measurement noise increases, the investor’s
signal is less informative about terminal value and, in her trading decision, she reacts less
aggressively to changes of the accouting report.  Her fixed amount of trading with regard to the
ex ante expected terminal value of the firm (i.e., b a) remains constant though, leading to the
described increase of the signal-to-noise ratio.
3. DISCLOSING THE REPORT TO THE MARKET
The preceding analysis assumed that the accounting report is released only to insiders of the firm
(the principal) who can use it to gain from trading on the stock market.  We characterized the
resulting incentive contract, the expected utility of the transient investor, and finally, the effects
of the investor’s initial endowment in the firm.  This chapter will investigate the expected utility
when the formerly private information is communicated to the stock market.  Finally, we will
compare the results for both settings and derive conditions under which disclosure of the private
information is preferred.  To distinguish these two cases we will use η1 to depict the firm’s
information system without disclosure and η2 for the information system with public disclosure. 
We will denote the price, incentive weight on price, and the expected utility to the principal with
the index 2 to denote the respective variables under information system η2.
3.1 Price Formation and Optimal Contract
If the firm discloses the accounting report y and the market makers can directly observe it
(information system η2), in equilibrium, there is no information asymmetry between actors on
the capital market.  In this case, the demand orders do not convey any further information to the
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market makers, hence, they will set the price based only on the observed report y.  This leads to
following characterization of the price and its characteristics.
Corollary 2: If report y is published to the market, stock price, its variance, sensitivity to the
agent’s effort choice, and signal-to-noise ratio are characterized by
p2 ' E[x|y] ' πf2 % πy y, (13a)
Var[p2] / σp22 ' ρ2 σx4 σi-2 , (13b)
ME[p2]/Ma / mp2 ' πy m, and (13c)
mp22/σp22 ' m2/σi2, (13d)
with
πf2 '  (b ! πy m) and
πy ' ρ σx2 σi-2.
As the report and the terminal value follow a normal distribution, in weighting the report the
market makers account for the unconditional mean and weight the report with its variance and
the covariance to the terminal value.  The resulting sensitivity to the agent’s action displays that
the market makers are unable to directly observe the agent’s action so that it influences price
only through its effect on the report.  The weighting of y in price is merely a linear transforma-
tion of y and, hence, the signal-to-noise ratio of price equals the respective measure of the
accounting report.  Note that σi2 ' σμ2 %ρ2 σx2 and, hence, the signal-to-noise ratio is decreasing
in the output uncertainty.
The contract between principal and agent can now be written on price without the need for
a normalization, such that
w(p2,z,η2) ' f2 % v2 p2 and
a†(v2) ' v2 mp2. (14)
The main difference to the setting in the last section is displayed in the expected utility to the
investor.  As there is no informational advantage concerning the terminal value of the firm she
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is unable to trade on superior information.  As the risk neutral investor is indifferent between
selling and holding her shares, she can now be characterized as a dedicated shareholder,
interested in the long-term value of the firm.  Her expected utility is given by
Π2(a,z) ' α0 E[x ! w|a,z]. (15)
The solution to the principal’s problem is a straightforward application of the well known moral
hazard problem with one performance measure.  Proposition 3 summarizes the principal’s uncon-
strained decision problem, the optimal weight on price, and the principal’s resulting expected
utility.
Proposition 3: If the price is set according to (13a), the principal’s unconstrained decision
problem, the optimal incentive rate, and the principal’s expected net payoff  are characterized
by
Π2(v2) ' α0 (b mp2 v2 ! ½ (mp22 % r σp22) v22) , (16a)
v2† ' b m Q2-1 πy-1, (16b)
Πy† ' ½ α0 b2 m2 Q2-1, (16c)
with Q2 ' m2 % r σi2.
The expected utility in (16c) is identical to a situation in which the principal could directly
contract on y because the signal-to-noise ratio of price equals that of the accounting report. 
Again, the initial endowment with shares does not affect the investor’s contractual choice.
3.2 Value of Disclosing the Report
To investigate the effect of disclosing report y to the capital market, we compare the expected
utility to the principal under the two different information systems, when y is either kept private
or is disclosed to the market.
Definition 1: The incremental value of disclosing report y to the capital market is
V(η2|η1) / Π2† ! Π†. (17)
To gain further insight into the value of disclosure, Corollary 3 characterizes the solution to
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(17) under two settings where (i) the accounting report does not provide information about effort
chosen by the agent (m ' 0) and (ii) there is no uncertainty about noise traders’ demand orders
(σL2 ' 0).
Corollary 3: 
(i) If the performance measure is not informative about a, the incremental value of
disclosing y to the market is
V(η2|η1) ' ! Π†.
(ii) If the market makers could directly observe the individual demand orders, the
incremental value of disclosing y to the market is
V(η2|η1) ' Π2†.
In setting (i), under information system η2, the market only gains information about the
uncertainty of the terminal value but not about the agent’s effort choice.  This makes the price
not informative about a and the principal will not be able to induce any effort.  Hence, disclosing
y has the effect of destroing both, gains of trading and any incentives for the agent to provide
productive effort.  In setting (ii) the principal can not gain anything from trading on her private
information because her trades are observable.  In this case she would not trade and no
information would be impounded into price under η1.  Disclosing the report then leads to a more
efficient price to display both the future value and past effort choices.
These two settings show the two effects of disclosing the accounting report, on the one hand,
the severity of the stewardship problem is changed because the characteristics of price as a
performance measure change (its sensitivity and noise).  On the other hand, disclosing the
formerly private measure destroys the expected gains of trading in the company’s stock. 
Proposition 4 characterizes the value of disclosing report y.
Propostition 4: The incremental value of disclosing report y to the stock market is
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V(η2|η1) ' (18a)
' ½ α0 b2 r σi2 σβ2(m2/σi2 ! mβ2/σβ2) Q-1 Q2-1 ! ½ ρ σx2 σL σi-1. (18b)
The last term in (18) describes the transient investor’s loss under η2 relative to η1 due to
diminished expected trading profits.  The first term in the incremental value of disclosure
describes the stewardship value of disclosing y.  If this term is positive (negative), the principal’s
ability to control the agent’s effort is higher under η2 (η1).  Essential for the sign of this term is
the difference of the signal-to-noise ratios of stock price under η2 and η1, as can be seen from the
second characterization of the value of disclosure (18b).  This difference is weighted by the
investor’s intitial endowment with shares of the firm.  If the signal signal-to-noise ratio of price
increases when disclosing y, a higher initial endowment makes it more likely that the investor
prefers disclosing y and foregoing trading profits.  If the principal cannot increase the
informativeness of stock price with regard to the agent’s effort choice she has a strict preference
for not disclosing the internal measure because it will diminish both short-term trading gains and
long-term firm value.  Corollary 4 provides a sufficient condition for a negative value of
disclosing the internal measure.
Corollary 4: The incremental value of disclosing y to the market is negative if the market’s
liquidity exceeds a certain threshold, specifically
σL2 > τL ' 2 ρ2 σx4 σi-2. (19)
The signal-to-noise ratio of stock price under information system η1 is increasing in the
accounting report’s sensitivity m at an increasing rate with the uncertainty about noise traders’
demand.  If the liquidity uncertainty is sufficiently high, the information content of price is
always higher when the accounting report is not published which is due to the informed
investor’s aggressive trading on her superior information.  For the disclosure of y to increase the
signal-to-noise ratio of price σL < τL is a necessary but not sufficient condition.  Corollary 5
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provides the necessary and sufficient condition under which disclosing the measure increases the
signal-to-noise ratio of price and, hence, is beneficial to the principal from a stewardship
perspective.
Corollary 5: To increase the signal-to-noise ratio of price by disclosing y, the liquidity
uncertainty has to be below and sensitivity of the disclosed accounting report above a certain
(positive) threshold, specifically
σL2 < τL and (20a)
m > τm ' b σi2  (2½ ρ σx2 ! σi σL)-1. (20b)
Given that condition (20a) holds, the accounting report still has to be sufficiently sensitive to the
agent’s effort choice.  While the signal-to-noise ratio under η2 is solely influenced by the
accounting report, under η1 it increases in both, the sensitivity of the accounting report and the
productivity.  To increase the principal’s ability to control the agent’s effort, the disclosed
report’s sensitivity has to cover both influences.  The threshold for m increases in the
productivity of the agent’s effort and in the influence of the report on price without disclosure. 
The variance of price increases with the output uncertainty under both disclosure regimes, if y
is disclosed however, the sensitivity of price to a also increases in σx2.  This leads to a lower
threshold level for disclosure to increase the signal-to-noise ratio of price.  Hence, a higher
output uncertainty leads to a higher incremental value of disclosing.
While increasing the stewardship-value of the only contractible performance measure (the
stock price) is a necessary condition for disclosure being preferred by the transient investor it is
not a sufficient condition as it does not take into account the loss of trading gains.  The expected
profits from trading on private information are driven by the extend of the informational
advantage of the insider.  The lower the measurement noise of the accounting report and the
higher the volatility of liquidity traders’ demand, the more valuable is the information for trading
purposes.  The severity of the agency conflict under both disclosure regimes also depends on
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these parameters.  As shown in Corollary 4 the value of price as a performance measure under
η1 increases in σL.  Hence, higher liquidity uncertainty leads to a higher incremental loss to the
principal when disclosing y due to both sources of profits, production and trading.
While the productivity of the agent’s effort and the sensitivity of the accounting report to do
not affect the expected trading profits, they do affect the solution to the stewardship problem. 
Figure 2.2 illustrates the relation between the value of disclosure and the sensitivity of the report
to the agent’s actions when condition (20b) holds.  Here, b ' r ' α0 ' ρ ' σx ' 1, σi ' 2, and σL
' 1/10:
Figure 2.2
Value of Disclosing Report y and
Report’s Sensitivity to the Agent’s Action
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Figure 2.2 illustrates that the incremental value of disclosing y to the market initially increases
in the accounting report’s sensitivity to the agent’s actions but decreases for higher values of m. 
The reason for the initial increase is that with m ' 0 the investor loses all profits when disclosing
the measure, as Corollary 3 (i) shows, and the value of disclosure is negative.  When m grows
larger the signal-to-noise ratio under η2 increase more than under η1, increasing the value of
disclosure.  However, as the report’s sensitivity further increases, the principal is able to extract
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higher net expected payoffs from the agency relationship under both regimes and the difference
between the signal-to-noise ratios decreases. As m approaches infinity there is no stewardship
value from disclosing the report, hence, the loss of disclosing y equals the loss due to missed
trading profits.
The productivity of the agent’s actions influences the value of disclosure in a similar way,
but with different reasons.  With a productivity of zero, only the expected profits from trading
are relevant and the disclosure leads to a loss.  Increasing the productivity increases the relative
weight of the productive output in the investor’s objective function.  As long as conditions (20a)
and (20b) hold, the value of disclosure is positive.  Due to the investor’s trading based on the
observed effort choice weighted by the productivity, further increases of b have a positive impact
on the signal-to-noise ratio without disclosure and, hence, lead to a negative value of disclosure
for high value of b.  Figure 2.3 illustrates this relation, here, r ' α0 ' ρ ' σx ' 1, m ' 10, σi ' 2,
and σL ' 1/10:
Figure 2.3
Value of Disclosing Report y
and Productivity
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b
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The two last discussions both indicate that for high values of either the report’s sensitivity
or the agent’s productivity, disclosure is not preferred.  Both effects rely on changes in the
signal-to-noise ratio of price and, hence, the decision to withhold information is preferred by
both, short-term and long-term investors.  This changes if the uncertainty with respect to output
is considered.  While, again, high values of this parameter lead to a negative value of disclosure,
the reason lies in the foregoing of high expected trading gains.  The signal-to-noise ratio of price
decreases under both disclosure regimes but it decreases more heavily when y is disclosed,
leading to a situation where dedicated shareholders might prefer disclosure of the accounting
report while transient investors would prefer to keep the report private to profit from trading on
this piece of information.  More specifically, disclosing the accounting report would improve
both the informativeness of price with regard to future cash flows (the market makers can
directly use y and do not have to rely on the information in demand) and the informativeness
with regard to the agent’s effort choice.  The transient investor, however, only partly takes into
account the effect of disclosing y on the productive effort because she is also interested in
potentially profiting from private information and, hence, will withhold the accounting report. 
Not disclosing the report will lead to a lower pay-performance sensitivity as the noise in price
is higher and the following optimal incentive weight lower.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This study investigates the relationship between disclosure policy, market microstructure, and
management incentives.  Focusing on the role of transient institutions we predict less disclosure
in (highly) liquid markets.  This result is due to the investor’s possible interest in short-term
trading gains at the cost of setting incentives for long-term productive effort.  It is known that
information can be withheld because the informativeness of price with regard to management’s
actions might not increase monotonously in the informativeness of price with regard to future
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payoffs (e.g., Heinle/ Hofmann 2009).  However, we present results that indicate that
information might be kept private even though it would increase both kinds of informativeness. 
To be more precise, the information might be withheld because it would increase the market
knowledge about the uncertain future cash flows and, hence, diminish profits from trading on
superior information.  Our results are supported by empirical studies showing that transient
institutions lead to a focus on short-term earnings (thus, less weight on long-term financial
information) and high volatility in the stock price, are attracted to companies with investor
relation activities geared toward providing forward-looking information (Bushee 2004), and that
institutional investors reduce the amount of voluntary disclosure (Hollander et al. 2008).  While
not being the primary focus of our study, our results indicate that the occurrence of transient
institutions as investors can lead to lower managerial incentives.  Here, two opposing effects can
be distinguished.  First, holding constant the disclosure regime, the occurrence of informed
trading increases the information content of price and will increase managerial incentives. 
However, endogenizing the decision to disclose or withhold information can turn this relation
around.  With a high uncertainty about future cash flows, disclosing accounting information can
increase the signal-to-noise ratio of price and lead to higher managerial incentives.  Transient
investors who are interested in short-term trading profits will prefer to give up productive effort
to increase their total expected profits by keeping information private.
Our results add to the understanding of the role of institutions as part of the investors of
companies and increase the insights derived from empirical studies.  While some papers
investigate the relation between liquidity and informativeness of stock using the probability of
insider trading as a proxy for informativeness13, we show that the assumed relationship might not
hold true when including the decision to disclose or withhold information.  Incorporating this
decision our results suggest that price can be more informative with less insider trading.  This
13 E.g., Kang/ Liu (2008).
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happens because the market is only able to extract some information from insider trades, while
the whole information gets conveyed when the information is publicly disclosed.  Furthermore,
our results support the notion that studies which investigate the relation between disclosure and
the fraction of shares held by institutional investors could be shaped by controlling for possible
differences in the type of institutional investor, e.g., in line with Bushee (1998).
However, we stress that we did not include possible interactions between liquidity and
disclosure (cf. Diamond/ Verrecchia 1991 show that disclosure can increase liquidity).  Including
this effect might lead to a situation where transient investors would like to disclose some
information to increase liquidity but withhold other information to trade on.  Bushman/
Indjejikian (1995) present results along similar lines.  They show that a corporate insider has
incentives to disclose some information to prevent outside investors to become privately
informed, but keep other information private, to increase his trading profits.  Another caveat is
that we did not include a link between the decision to become endowed with shares in the first
place.  Here, an interaction between the fraction held by an instiutional investor and the amount
of information he is able to extract from the firm might be important to consider.  Extending our
model to capture similar effects will influence the value of disclosure and may provide further
insights.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS
Corollary 1:  The investor maximizes (1) by choosing α1.  Substituting (3a) in (1), differentiat-
ing the result with respect to α1 and solving the first-order conditions for this variable leads to
θf ' (!b a % f % α0 v πd % θy m a % (1 % v) πf) (2 πd (1 % v))-1 and
θy ' !σx2 ρ σf-2 (2 πd (1 % v))-1
Substituting these solutions into (2) and assuming πd >0 yields the characterized equilibrium.
Lemma 1: Substituting  d '  dL ! α1, (3b), and (4a-d) in (3a) yields (5a).  Computing the
variance of (5a) gives (5b).  Differentiating (5a) with respect to a yields (5c). 
Proposition 1: Differentiating (10) with respect to v and solving the first-order condition for this
variable results in (11a).  Substituting the result in (10) yields (11b). 
Corollary 2: Given report y ' m a % ρ σx % gμ and normally distributed noise terms,
E[x|y] '  (b ! πy m) % ρ σx2 σi-2 y. 
Proposition 3: Substituting (14) into (6), choosing f such that CE(z,a†) ' 0, and substituting f2†
and a†(v2) ' v2 mp2 into (15) yields (16a).  Differentiating (16a) with respect to v2 and solving the
first-order condition for this variable results in (16b).  Substituting the result in (16a) yields
(16c). 
Corollary 4: Setting m2/σi2 < mβ2/σβ2 and solving for σL2 yields (19). 
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Corollary 5: Substituting m ' τm in (18) yields V(η2|η1) ' 0.  Taking the derivative of V(η2|η1)
with respect to m and substituting m ' τm yields , given σL2 < τL.
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ESSAY 3:
THE USE OF PRICE AND 
ACCOUNTING INFORMATION
IN COMPENSATION CONTRACTS
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1. INTRODUCTION
Agency theory started to being used in managerial accounting in the 1970s1.  Following this
introduction it “has been one of the most important theoretical paradigms in accounting during
the last 20 years” (Lambert 2001, 3).  Along with analytical studies and the insights provided by
their models, empirical incentive compensation studies “began by explaining practice but now
test agency-theoretic hypotheses” ( Zimmerman 2001, 417).  A substantial part of both types of
research (analytical and empirical) considers a trade-off between risk and incentives.  Agency
theory predicts a negative relation between the uncertainty in performance measures and their
usage in incentive contracts.  However, the empirical evidence on this topic is mixed and there
exists evidence which suggests that the weight a performance measure receives in a contract can
increase in the noise associated with that measure.2  While absolute weights of individual
measures are not directly observable and, hence, difficult to test, a different approach is to
consider the relative weights of performance measures in compensation contracts.  Banker/ Datar
(1989) developed a model which shows that the relative contractual weights on performance
measures are a function of their “signal-to-noise ratio”, i.e., the ratio of the marginal effect of the
agent’s effort on the measure and the variance of the measure.  Beginning with Lambert/ Larcker
(1987) this prediction gained empirical attention and support.  But while agency theory makes
predicitions about incentives stemming from the total wealth of a manager, early studies
investigated manager’s incentives stemming from cash pay only.3
More recently, Core/ Guay/ Verrecchia (2003) studied the relative incentive weights on price
and non-price measures in CEOs’ total compensation.  They do so using two somewhat different
approaches.  As a first approach, they regress the unexpected change in CEO compensation on
1 For a review of that literature see, e.g., Baiman (1982).
2 For a review and discussion of this literature see Prendergast (2002).
3 Bushman/ Smith (2001) provide a review of empirical studies on relative incentive weights and criticize the
investigation of cash pay only.
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annual price and accounting performance.  Here, they use the change in earnings per share as the
measure of accounting performance.  Opposite to theoretical results, their findings indicate that
“the relative weight on price and non-price performance measures in total compensation
increases with the ratio of the variances” (Core/ Guay/ Verrecchia 2003, 972).  They further
confirm this finding by replacing the change in earnings per share by a measure orthogonal (i.e.,
uncorrelated) to stock price.  This measure takes into account that the choice of accounting
measures used in compensation contracts is not observable and the variance of the measure is
estimated as the variance of changes in earnings per share that are not explained by stock returns. 
In a second approach, Core/ Guay/ Verrecchia (2003) estimate the incentives stemming from
price and non-price measures.  Theoretically, the incentives provided by a measure derive from
the product of the measure’s incentive weight with its sensitivity to the CEO’s effort choice.  By
calculating the optimal incentive weights and substituting terms, Core/ Guay/ Verrecchia (2003)
are able to replace the relative incentives provided by price and non-price measures with “the
ratio fo the variation in total compensation explained by the two performance measures” (Core/
Guay/ Verrecchia 2003, 962).  This second approach confirms the prior analysis by finding that
incentive ratio is positively related to the variance ratio. Again, the variance of the non-price
measures is proxied by the variance of changes in earnings per share that are not explained by
stock returns.
Core/ Guay/ Verrecchia (2003) offer three explanations for their findings: (i) observed
contracts are not optimal because they are either not in equilibrium or because CEOs take private
posistions in stock; (ii) effort incentives are not the main driver of compensation contracts, which
are driven by project selection instead; and (iii) the proxies for relative variance rather capture
relative sensitivity than noise.  We offer a different view and theoretically show that even if
effort incentives are the main concern and noise is measured correctly, the relative weight of
non-price measures can increase in their variance.  We derive this result by developing a model
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which distinguishes between different types of noise (measurement error of accounting
information and uncertainty related to the fundamental value of the firm) and allow the contract
to include more than one non-price measure.  Changing the noise captured in one measure leads
to adjustments of all incentive weights.  An increase in the variance of non-price measures can
then result in an increasing relative weight.  We relate our analysis to proxies used in empirical
studies and develop comparative static results with regard to published performance measures
and performance measures that are not published and are not correlated to price.  Finally, we
suggest a different setting to test the agency prediction: the change in relative incentive weights
before and after a change in the firm’s disclosure policy.  Here, we are able to derive a non-
ambiguous result with regard to the noise in an additionally disclosed report.  This method could
be applied in a cross-sectional context where changes in mandatory disclosure regulation lead
to increased disclosure but where the noise in the additionally disclosed information varies
across industries.
Our analysis is motivated by observations that firms use more than one financial or non-
financial measure in compensation contracts (e.g., Ittner/ Larcker/ Rajan (1997) find that the
average number of financial (non-financial) measures used in annual bonus contracts is 1.7 (2.3))
and that firms use information to reward top executives that is not observable to outsiders.4 
However, there is overwhelming empirical support for the use of price measures in incentive
contracts (Core/ Guay/ Verrecchia 2003 report that “for over 75 percent of the CEOs, the
incentives provided by stock price are approximately 12 times greater than the incentives
provided by performance measures orthogonal to price.”).  One explanation for these findings
is the “costliness or impossibility of contracting directly on the investors' other information can
4 See, e.g., Hayes/ Schafer (2000).  Ittner/ Larcker/ Rajan (1997, 234) state that
much of the information contained in non-financial measures about current managerial actions may not even
be reflected in current stock price because of its private or proprietary nature (e.g. internal customer
satisfaction surveys or research and development results).
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make it desirable to contract on the firm's market price” (Feltham/ Wu 2000, 155).  For this
reason, we include performance measures which are publicly observable but cannot be directly
used in the contract between shareholders and management.  Straightforward examples of such
measures are the progress of investment projects and management reputation.  Theory predicts
that the aggregation of information in price does not equal the optimal aggregation of
information for incentive purposes which provides the basic tension in our model (see, e.g.,
Feltham/ Xie 1994 and Heinle/ Hofmann 2009a).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 introduces the basic model
structure and describes a setting with a generic price and a single contractible accounting
measure (e.g., accounting earnings).  In section 3, we characterize the price if the accounting
report is published and investigate the relative weights placed on the accounting measure and
price.  Here we show that the relative incentive weight on earnings can increase in its noise. 
Because we are not able to investigate measures that are orthogonal to price in the just described
setting, we introduce a second contractible accounting measure which is not publicly disclosed
in section 4.  Here we can show that the incentive weight of the undisclosed accounting
information relative to price can increase in different measures of noise of the disclosed
information.  If the variance of the disclosed earnings report is used to proxy for the noise in non-
price measures, one would conclude that the relative weight of these measures increases in their
noise.  We extend this notion by showing that the aggregated weight on the contractible reports
relative to price can increase in the noise of either the published or the private measure.  Section
5 investigates the change in relative weights if the amount of disclosed information increases
(keeping the set of contractible measures constant).  Here we derive a non-ambiguous relation
between noise and the change in relative weight.  Following, we suggest that this change can be
used to test whether agency theory is descriptive about observed contracts.  Section 6 concludes.
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2. BASIC MODEL STRUCTURE
2.1 Performance Measures and Price Formation
At date 0, the principal, acting on behalf of the firm’s long term5 risk neutral owners, hires an
agent to provide productive effort at date 1 in return for compensation at date 2.  The agent’s
effort influences the firm’s terminal payoff6 where we assume a linear relation, i.e.,
x ' b a % gx,
where b 0 ú represents the productivity of the agent’s effort a and gx ~ N(0, σx2) represents
random events beyond the agent’s control.  The agent bears a personal cost of effort κ(a) which
we assume to be quadratic with
κ(a) ' ½ a2.
At date 2, information system η generates N  performance measures and releases (subsets of)
these reports to the principal and to investors.  Performance measures are either publicly reported
to investors (i.e., public performance measures) or undisclosed and only released to the principal
(i.e., private performance measures).  In addition, the information is either contractible (i.e.,
hard) or non-contractible (i.e., soft).7  Applying both classifications, we distinguish between
public performance measures of hard information, public measures of soft information, and
undisclosed performance measures of hard information.8  We assume a linear relation between
effort and performance, i.e.,
yi ' mi a % gi, i ' 1,...,N,
where mi represents the sensitivity of performance measure i to the agent’s effort level and gi is
5 We assume long term firm owners to exclude any trading on firm internal measures.  This assumption is also made
by Baiman/ Verrecchia (1995), Feltham/ Xie (1994), and Heinle/ Hofmann (2009a).  For a study on the effects of firm owners’
short-term interests on incentive contracts and disclosure decisions see Heinle/ Hofmann (2009b).
6 Alternatively, x may also represent the firm’s future market price.  We choose the terms payoff, terminal value, and
output to distinguish market price at date 2 from firm value at date 3.
7 A discussion about the existence of soft and hard information is provided by Heinle/ Hofmann (2009a).
8 Without loss in generality, we neglect undisclosed soft information.  Signals including this type of information can
neither be used by the principal in the contract with the agent nor by investors when updating their beliefs about the terminal
payoff.
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a normally distributed noise term with gi ~ N(0,σi2).  The noise of each performance measure
reflects uncontrollable events that affect the firm’s payoff (i.e, output uncertainty) plus
inaccuracy of the accounting system (i.e., measurement error).  Specifically, the noise inherent
in performance measure i is assumed to be
gi ' ρi gx % gμi, i ' 1,...,N,
where ρi characterizes the correlation of performance measure i to the output x and gμi represents
measurement error, with gμi ~ N(0,σμi2).  To facilitate the following analysis we assume that all
noise terms are independently distributed, i.e., Cov[gx,gμi] ' Cov[gμi,gμj] ' 0, i,j ' 1,...,N, thus σi2
' ρi2 σx2 % σμi2.  We will also restrict the analysis to cases in which all measures have a non-
negative correlation to the terminal value and a positive sensitivity with regard to the agent’s
actions.
To focus on the driving forces of the results we will employ a very simple price formation
process, equivalent to Feltham/ Xie (1994) and Heinle/ Hofmann (2009a).  Here, the capital
market is assumed to consist of homogeneous rational investors who set the price equal to the
expected value of the firm conditional on all available information: the publicly reported
performance measures.9  As the performance measures follow a normal distribution, in
computing the expected terminal value the investors correct the information for the unconditional
mean and weight the information according to their covariance with the terminal value, scaled
by the reports’ precision.  Thus, the market price will be linear in the available public reports and
will also be normally distributed.  Assuming that information system η discloses Np reports (with
Np<N), price π can be specified as
π(η) ' E[x|η] ' πo( ) % , (1)
where  denotes the investors’ expectations regarding the agent’s action, πo a constant, and αi
9 The signals that are made public are disclosed without additional error.  This assumption is common in the literature
on discretionary disclosure, where disclosure is often assumed to be truthful.  For a review of this literature see Verrecchia
(2001).
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the weight of report yi in price.  
2.2 Agent’s Preferences and Effort Choice
To keep the model as parsimonious as possible we initially consider a setting with only one
contractible non-price measure (e.g., accounting earnings) and treat price as a generic
performance measure (we investigate the characteristics of stock price in the subsequent
sections).  At date 0, the principal offers the agent a linear contract z ' (f,vc,vπ), where f is the
agent’s fixed wage, vc (vπ) the incentive rate for the contractible report (market price).  The
agent’s compensation w, given contractible information yc, price π, and contract z is
w(yc,π,z) ' f % vc yc % vπ π.
We assume that the agent’s preferences are represented by a negative exponential utility
function, with
u(z,a) ' !exp[!r(w ! κ(a))],
where r is his coefficient of absolute risk aversion.  Given a linear combination of normally
distributed measures in the agent’s compensation, maximizing the expected utility is equivalent
to maximizing the certainty equivalent, which is characterized by
CE(z,a) ' E[w|z,a] ! κ(a) ! ½ r Var[w|z] (2)
' f % vπ πo( ) % (vc mc % vπ mπ) a ! ½ a2 
! ½ r (vc2 σc2 % vπ2 σπ2 % 2 vc vπ σπc ),
where mπ denotes the sensitivity of stock price to the agent’s action (i.e., mπ ' ME[π]/Ma), σπ2 the
variance of stock price, and σπc the covariance between the contractible measure and price.  The
agent chooses a to maximize his certainty equivalent which results in the following characteriza-
tion of the agent’s action choice.
Lemma 1: Given contract z ' (f,vc,vπ), the agent’s optimal action choice is characterized by
a†(vc,vπ) ' mc vc % mπ vπ. (3)
Proof: Differentiating (2) with respect to a, and solving the first-order condition for this
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variable results in the optimal action choice as specified in (3).
2.3 Principal’s Preferences and Optimal Contract
When the principal offers contract z to the agent, she has to akes into account that the agent
can decide whether to accept the contract and that he will choose his level of unobservable effort
in order to maximize his expected utility.  The actions that are induced by z are characterized by
(3).  The agent will only participate in the firm if his contract z is such that it provides him with
his reservation wage, which is scaled to equal zero, i.e.,
CE(z,a†) $ 0. (4)
The principal is assumed to be risk neutral with respect to her expected utility.  More
specifically, she is interested in maximizing the expected terminal value of the firm net of the
agent’s compensation, i.e.,
Π(a,z,η) ' E[x ! w|a,z,η]. (5)
The principal chooses z such as to maximize (5) subject to (4) and (3).  Substituting (3) into (2),
choosing f such that CE(z,a†) ' 0, and substituting f † and (3) into (5) gives the principal’s
unconstrained decision problem:
Π(vc,vπ,η1) ' b (vcmc % vπmπ) ! ½ (vcmc % vπmπ)2 ! ½ r (vc2 σc2 % vπ2 σπ2 % 2 vc vπ σπc). (6)
The solution to the principal’s decision problem in this formulation equals that in a standard
agency relationship with two generic performance measures.
Lemma 2: The optimal incentive weights of the accounting measure and price in the contract
with the agent are characterized by
vc† ' b (mc σπ2 ! mπ σc2) Q-1, (7a)
vπ† ' b (mπ σc2 ! mc σπ2) Q-1, (7b)
with Q ' mc2 σπ2 % mπ2 σc2 % r σc2 σπ2 ! (2 mc mπ σπc % r σπc2).
Proof: Differentiating (6) with respect to vc and vπ, and solving the two first-order conditions
for the two variables results in the optimal incentive weights as specified in (7a) and (7b).
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As is usual in agency theory we derive the result, that the principal increases the weight on
a (price or non-price) measure if it is more informative about the agent’s actions.  This is in
contrast to the weighting of information in price where information is aggregated to predict the
future cash flows of the firm.  This divergence of weights arises from different objectives of
capital market participants and the principal.  While the former try to calculate the firm’s value
(which includes the realization of output uncertainty), the principal tries to detect the agent’s
action (with as little noise as possible).  We investigate the price setting mechanism and the
characteristics of price as a performance measure in the following section.
3. RELATIVE INCENTIVE WEIGHTS WITH A SINGLE NON-PRICE MEASURE
For the price to be used in the contract there has to be information impounded into price that
cannot be directly contracted on (public soft information).  Assume that information system η1
provides and publicly discloses one contractible (yc ' mca % ρcgx % gμc) and one non-contractible
(ys ' msa % ρsgx % gμs) report.10  Given that both measures are informative about the terminal value
of the firm, actors on the capital market use both measures to derive the price.  Given the
normally distributed noise terms, the (gross) market price is characterized by
π(η1) ' E[x|yc,ys] ' πo % αc yc % αs ys, (8a)
with πo ' (b ! αc mc ! αs ms) ,
αc ' Θ-1 ρc σx2 σμs2, (8b)
αs ' Θ-1 ρs σx2 σμc2, and (8c)
Θ ' σc2 σs2 ! (ρc ρs σx2)2.
Note that, as discussed above, the investors’ aggregation of information (i.e., αc and αs) does not
reflect the reports’ sensitivities to the agent’s action but instead is solely determined by the
10 Note that while disclosing soft information is weakly beneficial for the principal, disclosing the contractible report
in this setting does not have (either positive or negative) value to the principal.  For a study on the stewardship value of
accounting disclosures see Heinle/ Hofmann (2009a).
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respective measurement errors (σμc2 and σμs2) and their covariance with the firm’s terminal payoff
(ρc σx2 and ρs σx2).
From (7a) and (7b) it is obvious that the incentive weights assigned to both the contractible
performance measure and price crucially depend on the characteristics of stock price and, hence,
on the publicly available information.  Table 3.1 summarizes the relevant characteristics of price
and the incentive weights under information system η1.
Table 3.1
Characteristics of Price and Incentive Weights under η1
Price Characteristics
mπ ' Θ-1 σx2 (mc ρc σμs2 % ms ρs σμc2), (T1.1a)
σπ2 / Var[π|yc,ys] ' Θ-1 σx4 (ρc2 σμs2 % ρs2 σμc2), (T1.1b)
Incentive Weights
vc† ' b (mc ρs ! ms ρc) σx2 Θ Ω-1, (T1.2a)
vπ† ' b (ms σc2 ! mc ρc ρs σx2) Θ Ω-1, (T1.2b)
with Θ ' σc2 σs2 ! (ρc ρs σx2)2 and
Ω ' ρs σμc2 σx2 (mc2 σs2 % ms2 σc2 ! 2 mc ms ρc ρs σx2 % r (σc2 σs2 ! ρc2 ρs2 σx4)).
The characterization in Table 3.1 shows that the sensitivity of the firm’s stock price to the
agent’s action choice depends on the publicly available information.  Given that both measures
are positively correlated to the terminal value, we expect to observe an increasing sensitivity of
price to the agent’s action if the sensitivity of either performance measure increases.  The
absolute incentive weights given in (T1.2a) and (T1.2b) enable us to derive the following relative
weights placed on the accounting measure and price.
Corollary 111: The optimal weight placed on the accounting measure relative to price is
given by
11 Proofs are provided in Appendix A.
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vc†/vπ† ' .
Corollary 1 shows how the principal weights accounting earnings and price to provide
optimal incentives to the agent.  Note that the relative weight of the measures depends on the
sensitivities of both the contractible and the non-contractible report with regard to the agent’s
action and the terminal value.  Increasing a measure’s sensitivity to the agent’s effort choice will
lead to a higher relative weight, as the principal profits from increasing the level of effort the
agent supplies.  Altering the informativeness about terminal value of either measure will also
lead to a change in the relative weights.  This results because both measures covary through their
capturing of output related uncertainty.  We are specifically interested in the behavior of the
relative weights with regard to changes in the measures’ noise.  Consider the case in which the
contractible measure is not impounded into price because it is not informative about the terminal
value of the firm.
Corollary 2: If the earnings report is not informative about the terminal value its relative
weight in the contract is decreasing in its noise.
Banker/ Datar (1989) showed that the relative weight of two non-correlated measures is equal
to the ratio of the measures’ signal-to-noise ratios.  Hence, if the earnings report is not
impounded into price (because it in not informative about terminal value), its relative weight in
the contract will decrease with increasing noise.  This result holds, as long as there is no
correlation among the measures.  If the measure is impounded into price, the ratio of the
measures’ sensitivity to the agent’s action and the correlation to terminal value become
important (i.e., mi/ρi).
Proposition 1: An increase in the idiosyncratic noise inherent in accounting earnings will
lead to an increasing relative weight in the incentive contract if ms/ρs > mc/ρc.
The reason underlying the result in Proposition 1 is that the extent to which the principal uses
the contractible measure in the contract is influenced by how informative the measure is itself
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and how much it is being used in stock price, both vary with the measurement noise σμc2.  An
increase in this noise makes the earnings report less informative about terminal value, hence, the
capital market participants will decrease the weight they apply to the contractible measure and
increase the weight they apply to the non-contractible measure.  From (T1.2a) it is obvious, that
the absolute weight on accounting earnings is negative if ms/ρs > mc/ρc.  Hence, the earnings
report is used to filter out risk from stock price.12  When, due to an increase of σμc2, the earnings
report receives less weight in price, the principal will reduce the amount of risk filtering and the
ratio of the incentive weights will increase.  This result show that endogenizing the price
formation process in a theoretical model leads to the conclusion that the relative weight of a
measure in a compensation contract can increase in its noise.  Additionally, the stated relation
between the sensitivities and correlations of the two measures indicates that the uncontractible
information which is impounded into price is relatively more informative about the agent’s
effort.  This situation suggests that stock price is an important performance measure and will
receive a relatively high weight in the compensation contract, which is confirmed by the sample
of Core/ Guay/ Verrecchia (2003).
Besides analyzing the ratio of the contractual weights of price and non-prise measures, Core/
Guay/ Verrecchia (2003) further investigate the relative incentives deriving from these two
sources.  The incentives stemming from both can be characterized as the product of the
respective contractual weight and the sensitivity to the agent’s effort (i.e., vπ† mπ and vc† mc). 
Corollary 3 shows that the result from Proposition 1 holds when the ratio of incentives is
considered.
Corollary 3: An increase in the idiosyncratic noise inherent in accounting earnings increases
the ratio of incentives from accounting earnings and price if ms/ρs > mc/ρc.
12 While Core/ Guay/ Verrecchia (2003) find a positive relation between unexpected change in cash pay and change
in earnings per share, they cannot find a positive relation between total compensation and earnings per share (Core/ Guay/
Verrecchia 2003 report an insignificant negative relation).  This could be explained by the use of earnings to filter risk from
price.
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The explanation of corollary 3 equals the discussion of Proposition 1.  It shows that if the
stated relation between the two measures’ sensitivities to the agent’s action and correlations to
the terminal value holds and the measurement noise in the accounting earnings report increases,
the principal will employ a less negative weight on this measure.  Following, the ratio of of
incentives deriving from non-price and price measures increases in the idiosyncratic noise of the
non-price measure.
While Core/ Guay/ Verrecchia (2003) investigate the incentives arising from a measure
orthogonal to price, the discussion so far could only show an increase of the contractual weight
of a non-price measure in its noise when the measure itself is incorporated into price, and, hence,
correlated with the latter.  To align our model with the available empirical results, we extend the
analysis in the following section to a setting with an additional internal contractible measure,
which is not correlated with price.  This measure might be kept private to the firm because of its
proprietary nature.13
4. RELATIVE INCENTIVE WEIGHTS WITH MULTIPLE NON-PRICE MEASURES
This section extends the previous analysis by allowing the principal to contract on multiple
accounting reports, which are potentially private to the firm.  As noted above, the use of multiple
performance measures in compensation contracts seems to be descriptive (e.g., Ittner/ Larcker/
Rajan 1997).  We choose the following setting to investigate the relative weights of non-price
measures that are orthogonal to stock price.  Assume that information system η2 provides one
measure of soft (ys) and two measures of hard information (yc and yf).  While the soft information
is disclosed, only one of the two contractible measures (yc) is made public and the other one
remains private to the firm (yf).  To ensure that the internal measure and price do not covary, we
13 Berger/ Hann (2007) provide evidence that managers keep information private if its disclosure is associated with
high proprietary costs.
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assume it is not correlated to terminal value (i.e., ρf ' 0).14  Panel A of Table 3.2 summarizes the
three measures provided by η2.
Table 3.2
Reports and Incentive Weights under η2
Panel A: Reports provided by η2
yf ' mf a % gμf,
yc ' mc a % ρc gx % gμc, and
ys ' ms a % ρs gx % gμs.
Panel B: Incentive Weights
vc† ' b (mc ρs ! ms ρc) σx2 σμf2 Θ Φ-1, (T2.1a)
vf† ' b mf ρs σx2 σμc2 Θ Φ-1, (T2.1b)
vπ† ' b (ms σc2 ! mc ρc ρs σx2) σμf2 Θ Φ-1, (T2.1c)
with Θ ' (σμc2 % ρc2 σx2) (σμs2 % ρs2 σx2) ! (ρc ρs σx2)2,
Ω ' ρs σμc2 σx2 (mc2 σs2 % ms2 σc2 ! 2 mc ms ρc ρs σx2 % r (σc2 σs2 ! ρc2 ρs2 σx4)),  and
Φ ' mf2 ρs σx2 σμc2 Θ % σμf2 Ω.
The set of public measures is the same under η1 and η2, hence, the relevant characteristics of
stock price are characterized in (T1.1a) and (T1.1b).  Different from η1, the principal can now
include three measures in the incentive contract.  Taking into account the altered incentive and
individual rationality constraints and maximizing her expected net profit leads to the three
optimal incentive weights specified in Panel B of Table 3.2.  As a first step, we investigate the
ratio of the weights the private measure and stock price receive in the contract.  To compare our
results to Core/ Guay/ Verrecchia (2003), we also study the incentives deriving from all non-
price measures relative to the incentives from price.15  Corollary 4 summarizes these two
expressions.
14 This assumption also prevents capital market participants from being interested in the internal measure.  If it was
correlated to terminal value and compensation was disclosed at the time of price formation, investors could infer the value of
yf and include this information when setting the price.
15 We do not analyze the sum of the contractiual weights on the accounting reports relative to price, i.e., (vc† % vf†)/vπ†,
because the two contractible accounting reports yc and yf might be measured in different scales or units (i.e., accounting earnings
and through-put time).
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Corollary 4: 
(i) The optimal weight placed on the private contractible report relative to price is given
by
vf†/vπ† ' . (9a)
(ii) The ratio of incentives stemming from all non-price measures and price is given by
' . (9b)
Corollary 4 (i) shows that, intuitively, the relative weight of the internal measure increases
with its sensitivity to the agent’s actions (because the signal-to-noise ratio of the internal
measure increases), whereas it decreases in the non-contractible measure’s sensitivity.  As the
latter increases, price becomes a more valuable performance measure and will receive higher
weight in the contract.  This happens because the capital market’s aggregation of reports is
independent from their sensitivity to the agent’s actions.  By altering the sensitivity of the public
information, the aggregation of the different reports in price does not change but only the
sensitivity of price is affected.  In (ii) we compare the incentives the agent derives from his
compensation that is based on accounting performance (vc†mc % vf†mf) and that is based on stock
price performance (vπ†mπ).  The relative incentives stemming from non-price measures increase
in the sensitivities of both contractible accounting reports (because they become more
informative) but decrease in the sensitivity of the public soft information (as price becomes more
informative and the non-price measures are less employed).  Another straightforward observation
is that an increasing measurement noise in the unpublished accounting report (σμf2) decreases the
relative incentives stemming from non-price measures, similar to the change in (9a).  Here, the
unpublished accounting report becomes less informative about the agent’s action choice and this
change has no effect on the informational content of the published measures and, hence, on price. 
Following, the prinicpal decreases the incentive weight on yf and both, the relative weight and
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the incentives stemming from yf are reduced.
To compare our results with Core/ Guay/ Verrecchia (2003), we are particularly interested
in comparative static results regarding the noise inherent in the reports.  Proposition 2
summarizes our results with regard to the relative weight placed on the undisclosed measure.
Proposition 2: The weight on the internal measure relative to stock price increases
(i) in output uncertainty,
(ii) in the public report’s measurement noise if ms/ρs > mc/ρc.
Proposition 2 summarizes conditions under which a measure that is used for contracting
purposes, but which is orthogonal to stock price, receives a higher contractual weight relative
to price.  Part (i) shows that this happens if output uncertainty increases.  As we do not change
the correlation coefficients and the measurement noise of the public reports, increasing the
output uncertainty makes the public reports more informative about terminal value and, hence,
leads to a higher weight of the public reports in price.  While that increases both the signal
(sensitivity to the agent’s actions) and noise (variance) of price, the latter effect dominates the
former.  This leads to a decreasing value of price as a performance measure.  The same holds true
for published hard information.  As the stewardship value of the undisclosed measure is not
affected by an increasing output uncertainty (due to ρf ' 0) its relative weight increases.
Part (ii) shows that the relative weight on the orthogonal measure can increase with an
increase of the measurement noise in the disclosed measure.  When the condition in (ii) holds,
i.e., ms/ρs > mc/ρc, price receives a positive weight in the contract and, as mentioned above, the
disclosed accounting report is used to filter noise from stock price.   If the measurement noise
in this measure increases, the principal reduces its weight and increases the weight on the other
available performance measures (price and the internal accounting report).  However, the
increase is more pronounced for the undisclosed accounting report because price becomes less
useful as a performance measure as less noise can be filtered out.  Hence, the conditional signal-
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to-noise ratio of price decreases while the undisclosed measure’s signal-to-noise ratio is not
affected by the increase in noise.
Summarizing, the results of Proposition 2 show that if the variance of non-price measures
is proxied by the (observable) variance of a published report, an increase in the measured
variance can lead to an increasing relative weight on the non-price measure which is orthogonal
to price.  This holds true even if the parts of the published reports variance increase that are not
affected by changes in the variance of the underlying economic value.  Following, empirical
findings that the relative weight of orthogonal non-price measures increases with the variance
of non-price measures (proxied by the variance of a public measure) can not necessarily be seen
as evidence against agency theory.
The previous analysis focused exclusively on the contractual relative weight of an orthogonal
measure.  To complete the analysis, Proposition 3 shows that the above stated relation between
the relative incentives and measurement noise in the public contractible measure continues to
hold.
Proposition 3: The ratio of incentives stemming from non-price measures and price
increases in the published accounting report’s measurement noise if ms/ρs > mc/ρc.
Proposition 3 confirms the prior results and shows that if the stated relation between the
public non-contractible and the public contractible measure holds, the agent will receive
relatively higher incentives from non-price measures than from price when the noise in the
public accounting measure increases.  We specifically refer to noise that is not explained by
changes of the output uncertainty because we believe that this part of noise better reflects noise
that is empirically testable.  The explanation for this result equals that of Proposition 2 (ii).  The
increase will be more sharply now because in addition to increasing the weight on the private
measure and decreasing the weight on price, the principal will also increase the weight on the
public measure of hard information.  This happens because the latter is used to filter out noise
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of price and, hence, receives negative weight in the contract.  As the extent to which noise can
be filtered from price decreases, the measure is used less, which means the principal applies a
lower negative weight on the measure.  Summarizing, the stated relation between the ratio of
contractual weights on non-price measures and price as well as the ratio of incentives stemming
from these two sources can increase in the noise of non-price measures if the latter is proxied by
the noise of a public measure.  This shows that endogenizing the formulation of price can turn
around standard predictions of agency theory and lead to the empirical findings documented by
Core/ Guay/ Verrecchia (2003).
5. CHANGES IN DISCLOSURE POLICY AS AN ALTERNATIVE SETTING
TO TEST AGENCY PREDICTIONS
The previous discussion indicates that the impact of an increase in noise on the relative weights
applied to and stemming from various measures used in a contract depends on the sensitivities
of the respective measures to the agent’s effort choice.  We investigated this problem under
different information systems, however, we kept the set of public available measures constant. 
The set of available measures has an impact on the characteristics of price, so it will change the
optimal weight applied to the measures used in the contract.  This section introduces a different
setting to test the predicions of agency theroy: a change in the amount of disclosed reports. 
While the basis for our investigation is information system η2, we will introduce a change in the
set of disclosed measures.  Specifically, information system η3 only discloses the measure of soft
information (ys), keeping both contractible measures private to the firm (yc and yf).  Table 3.3
provides the optimal weights placed on the two contractible measures and price under η3.
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Table 3.3
Incentive Weights under η3
vc‡ ' b (mc σs2 ! ms ρc ρs σx2) ρs σx2 σμc2 σμf2 Θ Φ-1, (T3.1a)
vf‡ ' b mf ρs σx2 σμc2 Θ Φ-1, (T3.1b)
vπ‡ ' b (ms σc2 ! mc ρc ρs σx2) σs2 σμc2 σμf2 Θ Φ-1, (T3.1c)
with Θ ' (σμc2 % ρc2 σx2) (σμs2 % ρs2 σx2) ! (ρc ρs σx2)2,
Ω ' ρs σμc2 σx2 (mc2 σs2 % ms2 σc2 ! 2 mc ms ρc ρs σx2 % r (σc2 σs2 ! ρc2 ρs2 σx4)),  and
Φ ' mf2 ρs σx2 σμc2 Θ % σμf2 Ω.
Note, that the optimal weight on the internal measure yf is the same under the two
information systems η2 and η3.  Price π and the two contractible measures yc and yf provide a
sufficient statistic for yc, yf, and ys under both information systems.  Hence, the information about
the agent’s effort choice the principal can derive under the two information system remains
constant and, as yf is not correlated to either price or yc, its weight is not affected by the
disclosure decision.  The optimal weights specified in (T2.1a and c) as well as in (T3.1a and c)
can be used to derive the following characterization of the weight on yc relative to price under
(i) information system η2, (ii) information system η3, and (iii) the difference between these two
ratios.
Corollary 5: 
(i)  The contractual weight of report yc relative to π under η2 is given by:
 vc† /vπ† ' . (10a)
(ii)  The contractual weight of report yc relative to π under η3 is given by:
 vc‡ /vπ‡ ' . (10b)
(iii) change in relative weights after disclosure of yc is given by
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 Δ(η2,η3) ' vc†/vπ† ! vc‡/vπ‡ ' . (10c)
Note, that the relative incentive weights on the earnings report and price under both
information systems are not influenced by the accounting report yf that remains private to the
firm.  The existence of this report influences the incentive weights on the other available
measures to the same extent, such that it does not influence the ratio of incentive weights.  The
difference between the relative weight on accounting earnings and price under the two
information systems derives from the change in the disclosure regime.  While η2 discloses
accounting earnings, η3 withholds this report.  When designing the incentive contract, the
principal takes the effect of disclosing the earnings report on price into account which is
expressed by the difference of the ratios under the two information systems (10c).  The relative
weight placed on the published accounting report decreases if it is disclosed and then used to
filter out noise from price, i.e., if ms/ρs > mc/ρc.  Proposition 4 characterizes how the change in
relative weights reacts to changes in the noise of the additionally disclosed measure.
Proposition 4: The difference in relative weights placed on non-price measures after and
before the disclosure of an additional report increases in the published reports measurement
noise.
Note that the result in Proposition 4 is independent of the signal-to-noise ratios of the
different available measures (given our assumptions about positive correlation to the terminal
value and positive sensitivities to the agent’s effort choice).  If our model does describe the
underlying drivers of incentive weights in compensation contracts, we would expect that, ceteris
paribus, if firms change their disclosure policy (e.g., because of a change in mandatory
disclosure requirements) and optimally adjust the contract, the difference in the incentive
weights of the disclosed measure relative to price will be higher for firms which disclose
measures with higher idiosyncratic noise.
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6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we examined the behavior of optimal relative weights of price and non-price
measures in linear incentive contracts.  Empirical research is conducted under the prediction that
the relative weights are an increasing function of the relative signal-to-noise ratios.  Assuming
that the sensitivity remains constant, this leads to the hypothesis that the relative weight of a
measure decreases in its variance.  This prediction is usually developed in a model with two
generic measures, where one is interpreted as some accounting performance measure (e.g.,
accounting earnings) and the other one as the firm’s stock price.  We show that this prediction
does not hold true if the price formatting process in endogenized and one allows for more than
one accounting performance measure.  Specifically, we find that the contractual weights of and
the incentives derived from non-price measures relative to price can increase in the noise of non-
price measures.
While empirical studies interpret the increase of relative weights in their noise as evidence
that effort incentives are not the primary determinant of contracts, we show that even in a setting
without investment project selection problems increasing relative weights can be obtained.  The
reason for this lies in endogenizing the price formation.  Altering the characteristics of a public
report impacts the value of price as a performance measure in incentive contracts.  Both changes
have an effect on the optimal aggregation of all available and contractible measures in the
contract.  These can finally lead to the explained increase in the relative incentive weights. 
Furthermore, our results show that one cannot simply assume a constant sensitivity of all
performance measures (especially price), if the variance of the measure is changed.  We propose
an alternative setting to test the agency hypothesis: investigating the change of relative weights
with regard to different disclosure regimes.  If the idiosyncratic noise of a measure can be
identified, the suggested measure provides a non-ambiguous relation between the measurement
noise and the change in relative incentive weights.  While there is evidence on changes in the
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pay-performance relation due to greater transparency, future research could investigate effects
of increased disclosure on relative incentive weights and relate the findings to agency theory.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS
Corollary 1:  Dividing (T1.2a) by (T1.2b) yields (8). 
Corollary 2:  Setting ρc ' 0 in (8) and taking the derivative with regard to σμc2 yields
.
Proposition 1:  Taking the derivative of (8) with regard to σμc2 yields .
Substituting ms/ρs >mc/ρc proofs the claim. 
Corollary 3:  Dividing the product of (T1.2a) and mc by the product of (T1.2b) and (T1.1a) and
rearranging terms provides
 (A.1)
Taking the derivative of (9) with regard to σμc2 and substituting ms/ρs >mc/ρc proofs the claim.
Table 3.2, Panel B: Denote the vector yN'(yc, yf, π) such that y ~N(m a,Σ), with mN'(mc, mf, mπ)
and Covariance matrix Σ, further denote the vector of incentive weights vN'(vc, vf, vπ). 
Following, the agent’s compensation is characterized by
w(y,z) ' f % vN y.
Using this notation leads to the follwing characterization of the agent’s certainty equivalent
CE(z,a) ' f % vπ πo( ) % vNm a ! ½ a2 ! ½ r vNΣ v (A.2)
Differentiating (A.2) with respect to a, and solving the first-order condition for this variable
results in following optimal action choice:
a†(v) ' vNm. (A.3)
Besides the incentive compatibility constraint, the principal also has to take the individual
rationality constraint, as specified in (4), into account when she offers contract z to the agent. 
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The principal chooses z such as to maximize (5) subject to (4) and (A.3).  Substituting (A.3) into
(A.2), choosing f such that CE(z,a†) ' 0, and substituting f † and (A.3) into (5) gives the
principal’s unconstrained decision problem:
Π(v,η2) ' b vNm ! ½ vNmmNv ! ½ r vNΣ v. (A.4)
Taking the derivative of (A.4) with respect to v and solving for these variables results in
v† ' b m Q-1, (A.5)
with Q ' mmN ! r Σ.
Subsituting (T1.1a) and (T1.1b) in (A.5) provides the solutions in (T2.1a-c) 
Corollary 4:  Dividing (T2.1a) by (T2.1c) yields (9a), dividing the sum of (T2.1a) and (T2.1b)
by (T2.1c) provides the solution in (9b). 
Proposition 2: Taking the derivative of (9a) with regard to 
(i) σx2 yields  >0.
(ii)  σμc2 yields , substituting ms/ρs > mc/ρc proofs the claim.

Proposition 3:  Taking the derivative of (9b) with regard to σμc2 yields
substituting ms/ρs > mc/ρc proofs the claim. 
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Corollary 5: 
(i)  Dividing (T2.1a) by (T2.1c) yields (10a),
(ii)  dividing (T3.1a) by (T3.1c) yields (10b), and
(iii) (10c) is given by the difference of (10a) ! (10b). 
Proposition 4:  Taking the derivative of (10c) with regard to σμc2 yields
. 
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CONCLUSION
This thesis investigates the relation between accounting disclosure and the solution to the
stewardship problem in corporations.  While all essays incorporate managements’ compensation
contracts, the first two essays study the value of disclosure to different types of current
shareholders and the third essay focuses on the relative weighting of price and non-price
measures in contracts.
Companies try to address the agency conflict, arising through the delegation of control from
shareholders to management, by designing compensation contracts that align managements’
interests with those of the firm owners.  Empirical research shows that firms’ use a variety of
performance measures1, some which are publicly observable and that others remain private to
the firm.2  However, empirical studies also suggest that recent compensation contracts are
heavily based on stock price performance.3  Standardsetters, on the other hand, demand increases
in the level of corporate disclosure and also demand access to more forward-looking or “soft”
information.  Certainly, disclosing more information (weakly) improves the market’s efficiency
in displaying the value of the firm.  
The first essay focuses on the current shareholders’ ability to mitigate the stewardship
problem and provides results that indicate that disclosing more information can be harmful to
firm owners even in the absence of concerns about disclosing proprietary information.  The
reason lies in the non-contractible nature of information which is impounded into price.  If all
information could be contracted on, there is no need to use price as a performance measure. 
When soft information is available this crucially changes.  Now, the firm owners’ ability to set
incentives for their management depends on the information available to capital market
1 See Ittner/ Larcker/ Rajan (1997).
2 See Hayes/ Schaefer (2000).
3 See Core/ Guay/ Verrecchia (2003).
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participants and its aggregation into price.  Disclosing soft information can lead to a stock price
which is less informative about management’s action choices and, hence, be harmful to current
shareholders.  My results suggest that in response to a mandatory disclosure of soft information,
firms might reduce their voluntary disclosure of both soft and hard information.  This could
finally oppose standardsetters’ intention and harm the informativeness of price with regard to
future cash flows.
The value of accounting disclosure for firm owners could also be affected by investors’
potential trading gains in case the information is kept private.  Empirical studies provide
evidence that a certain group of institutional investors is interested in short-term trading gains. 
These “transient” investors are characterized by a high portfolio turnover and a short investment
horizon.  The second essay investigates the value of disclosure from the view of these
instiutional investors.  I show that they face additional costs when disclosing information by
foregoing potential trading gains.  This can lead to situations in which information is kept private
even though its disclosure would be valuable from a stewardship perspective.  The investor faces
a trade-off between a more efficient solution to the agency problem and short-term trading
profits.  The endogenous decision to disclose or withhold information can lead to an inverse
relation between market liquidity and the informativeness of stock price with regard to
management’s actions.  More liquidity allows the investor to benefit more from private
information which, in turn, increases the cost of disclosure.  If the investor’s endowment with
firm shares is not too high or the report which is to be disclosed does not sufficiently improve
managment’s incentives, the investor prefers the information to remain private.  This result
suggests that empirical studies, testing the relation between pay-for-performance sensitivity and
the liquidity of capital markets, should control for the composition of a firm’s investor base.
Empirical studies that test agency-theoretic predictions usually derive the hypotheses from
highly stylized models.  One central prediction is that the relative weights assigned to two
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measures in a compensation contract are a function of the measures’ relative “signal-to-noise”
ratios.  While the sensitivity of a measure with regard to management’s actions is unobservable,
the noise can be proxied by the variance of observable measures.  A common test is whether the
relative weights assigned to accounting measures and stock price behave as predicted by agency
theory.  Current studies show, however, that the relative weights can increase in their respective
noise.  The third essay focuses on this prediction.  Allowing for the facts that stock price is
rationally determined on capital markets and that companies use both publicly observable and
private measures in compensation contracts, I show that, under realistic situations, the weight
on non-price measures can increase in proxies for their noise.  The sign of the change depends
on the sensitivity of the different measures with regard to management’s actions.  Even allowing
for measures that are uncorrelated to stock price and investigating the relative incentives
stemming from price and non-price measures provides this result.  I suggest a different setting
to empirically test whether compensation contracts behave accordingly to agency theory: the
relative weights assigned to price and non-price measures before and after a change in corporate
disclosure.  Here, I derive an expression which provides a non-ambiguous relation between the
noise in disclosed accounting reports and the difference in relative weights.
Summarizing, my results indicate that the different interests current and potential
shareholders have leads to far reaching impacts of the disclosure of accounting information.  The
simple statement that more information is always better does not hold and changes of mandatory
disclosure can lead to losses for different types of current investors as well as for potential
investors.
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